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Article
American Trust Law in a Chinese Mirror
Frances H. Fostert
INTRODUCTION
American legal missionaries have left their mark on post-
9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq.1 Under the banner of democracy
and the rule of law, 2 U.S. legal professionals of every stamp
have launched an ambitious effort to transform the Afghan and
t Edward T. Foote II Professor of Law, Washington University School of
Law. A.B., Princeton University, 1977; M.A., J.D., Yale University, 1981;
J.S.D., Stanford University, 1987. I thank Lynn LoPucki for comments on ear-
lier drafts of this Article, and John Balzano for his assistance with research. I
owe a special debt of gratitude to Wei Luo, Director of Technical Services,
Washington University School of Law Library, for his tireless efforts to pro-
vide me with the latest Chinese-language trust law materials. Unless other-
wise indicated, all translations are by the author. Copyright 0 2010 by
Frances H. Foster.
1. See, e.g., Chuck Marsh, Air Force 'Legal Eagles'Meet With Afghan Mil-
itary Legal Leaders, ARMED FORCES INFO. SERVICE, Aug. 23, 2006, http://www
.militaryconnection.com/news/august-2006/afghan-legal-leaders.html (report-
ing that Lindsay Graham, South Carolina Senator and appellate judge in the
Air Force Reserve, explained his goals for a two-day military law training se-
minar in Kabul thus: "The purpose behind my visit and this whole effort is to
get the Afghan military to buy into the rule of law .... The military can (then)
spread it to the country.").
2. See Jim Phipps et al., Middle Eastern Law, 38 INT'L LAW. 703, 704
(2004) (describing ABA Middle Eastern Law Committee members' assistance
with "rule of law and judicial reform activities" in Afghanistan and Iraq); Ca-
rolee Walker, Afghan Women Judges Pursue Legal Training in the United
States, AMERICA.GOV, June 23, 2006, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile
-englishl2006/June/20060622183516bcreklawO.424206.html (quoting Ambas-
sador Steve E. Steiner, chair of a roundtable discussion with Afghan judges, as
stating that "[tihe United States remains firmly committed to assisting Afg-
hanistan in its remarkable journey toward a strong democracy where all citi-
zens enjoy equal rights and can aspire to economic prosperity"); see also
Phipps et al., supra, at 712 (noting that "[tihis friendly advice" may have
pragmatic objectives as well, and stating that "[t]he bottom line is that the
New Iraq will pursue policies that are friendly to America and will remain
amenable to American persuasion and influence in such areas as economics,
trade, foreign affairs, and security, to name a few").
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Iraqi legal landscapes. 3 American attorneys have served as pro
bono legal advisors to the Karzai government's Afghanistan
Commercial Law Project. 4 U.S. State Department personnel
have worked with Afghan ministries to create a "holistic reform
framework"5 and have helped the Iraqi government to establish
a criminal justice system. 6 American law professors have
drafted constitutions for Afghanistan and Iraq7 and have even
given Iraqi lawyers "a crash course on international human
rights law."8 U.S. judges have shared their expertise with their
Afghan and Iraqi counterparts in, for example, intensive train-
ing courses on "judicial ethics, relations with other branches of
government, public access to the courts[,] and judicial indepen-
dence."9 American law school deans and faculty have targeted
the legal education process. The University of Washington, for
instance, has established the Afghanistan Legal Educators
Program, which provides Afghan law professors postgraduate
3. For discussions of other countries' legal assistance efforts for Afgha-
nistan and Iraq, see PANOS KOUTRAKOS, EU INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW
469 (2006) (reporting that in March 2005, the European Union established the
EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq to assist in "police, rule of law and
civil administration matters"); Case Western Reserve University, Case Law
Professors Help Iraq Train New Judiciary (June 4, 2004), http://www.case
.edulnews/2004/6-04/waters.htm (stating that "international law experts from
Canada, Ireland, Scotland, Egypt, and the United States" offered a training
session in Dubai for forty-eight Iraqi defense attorneys). For a critical view of
foreign reform efforts, see Faiz Ahmed, Afghanistan's Reconstruction, Five
Years Later: Narratives of Progress, Marginalized Realities, and the Politics of
Law in a Transitional Islamic Republic, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 269 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.gonzagajil.org (presenting a critical analysis of efforts to
transplant Western legal models in Afghanistan).
4. See Phipps et al., supra note 2, at 705. In this capacity, they have
drafted and reviewed legislation on such diverse topics as banking, hydrocar-
bons, and property. Id. at 705-08.
5. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CIVILIAN POLICE AND RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS 1
(2008), http://merln.ndu.edularchivepdflafghanistan/State/98167.pdf.
6. Id. at 2 ("INL's Rule of Law Programs help the Government of Iraq
establish a criminal justice system that is sufficiently effective and fair that
Iraqi citizens will turn to it, rather than violent militias and other 'alternative'
forms of justice, to resolve disputes and seek justice.").
7. See, e.g., Constitutionalism and Emerging Democracies, ISSUES OF
DEMOCRACY, Mar. 2004, at 1, 5, http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/ej/ijde03O4.pdf
(stating that then-NYU (now Harvard) law professor Noah Feldman "partici-
pated in the creation of the new constitution in Afghanistan and has consulted
in the development of Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law that was recent-
ly signed").
8. Case Western Reserve University, supra note 3.
9. Barbara Dillon Hillas, Iraqi Judges Come to Prague, FOREIGN SER-
VICE J., Mar. 2005, at 38, 40.
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legal training, exposure to American law school teaching me-
thods, and assistance with curriculum development.' 0
These reform efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq are only the
latest incarnation of U.S. foreign legal assistance programs."
For decades, American legal professionals have exported or, in
comparative law parlance, 12 "transplanted" American rules, in-
stitutions, procedures, and values to countries from Albania1 3
to Zambia.14 This practice has become so familiar that it has
even penetrated American popular culture. In 2005, the deni-
zens of NBC's "West Wing" took time out of their busy sche-
dules to discuss an American law professor's draft constitution
for Belarus.15
10. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 5. For descriptions of the Afghanistan
Legal Educators Program, see University of Washington Law School, Afghan
Dean's Conference and Grant Update, http://www.law.washington.edu/news/
ebriefs/sp06/afghangrant.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2009); University of Wash-
ington School of Law, Afghan Legal Educator's Project (2005-2011), http://
www.law.washington.edu/Asianlaw/Research/Projects/AfghanLegalEducators
Project.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2009); see also INT'L INST. OF HIGHER STUDIES
IN CRIMINAL SCIENCES & INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW INST., JUSTICE AND HU-
MAN RIGHTS: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ AC-
TIVITIES 2003-2006, at 14-16 (2007), http://www.isise.org/public/BrocDesigned
.pdf (discussing the legal education reform project in Iraq carried out by De-
Paul University College of Law's International Human Rights Law Institute
in conjunction with the Italian International Institute of Higher Studies in
Criminal Sciences).
11. Two prominent examples are the United States' involvement in draft-
ing the post-World War II Japanese Constitution and the United States law
and development movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the 1960s
and 1970s. For a sampling of the extensive literature on these legal assistance
precedents, see, for example, John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and
Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and De-
velopment Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977); Kenneth L. Port, Article 9
of the Japanese Constitution and the Rule of Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L L. 127
(2005); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement,
1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062.
12. See infra Part I (discussing the origin of the term "legal transplants"
and recent challenges to that term by comparative law scholars).
13. See, e.g., CHEMONICS INT'L INC., ALBANIA ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS
REPORT JUNE 29-JULY 11, 2003, at 1-24 (2003), http://www.usaid.gov/our
work/cross-cutting-programs/wid/pubs/wlr albaniaassessment analysis.pdf
(summarizing efforts by the U.S. Agency for International Development and
the ABA's Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative "to promote rule of
law issues in Albania").
14. See, e.g., J. Rich Leonard, Zambian Trips Provide Judge with Adven-
tures, Insights into Africa, INT'L JUD. OBSERVER, Sept. 2006, at 3, 3 (reporting
the experience of a U.S. judge who "act[ed] as a consultant to the Zambian ju-
diciary" and "helped draft new rules of procedure for the Zambian courts").
15. The West Wing: The Wake Up Call (NBC television broadcast Feb. 9,
2005).
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The United States is not alone. Throughout history, nearly
every nation in the world has participated in legal trans-
plants. 16 Indeed, the leading authority on legal transplants,
Alan Watson, has concluded that legal transplants from abroad
are so common that "[m]ost changes in most systems are the
result of borrowing." 17 And, as Edward Rock and Michael
Wachter have reminded us, legal transplants can occur-for
better or worse-within as well as across national boundaries.18
Legal transplants have long attracted scholarly attention.
Although Alan Watson "popularized" 19 the term "legal trans-
plants" in 1974,20 earlier scholars had identified this phenome-
non. For example, in 1938, Roscoe Pound declared that the
"history of a system of law is largely a history of borrowings of
legal materials from other legal systems and of assimilation of
materials from outside of the law."2 1 As Watson himself ac-
knowledged, he was not even the first to use the term "trans-
plant." Indeed, a few months before Watson's book appeared in
print, Otto Kahn-Freund published an article Watson called
"important and fascinating," 22 which explicitly referred to
16. One possible exception is Tristan da Cunha, an "isolated island com-
munit[y]" that had "only sporadic communications with the outside
world ... [and] developed a unique legal system." Walter 0. Weyrauch &
Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies," in
GYPSY LAW: ROMANI LEGAL TRADITIONS AND CULTURE 11, 84 (Walter 0. Wey-
rauch ed., 2001); see Walter 0. Weyrauch, The Law of Tristan da Cunha, 2002
JURID. REV. 261, 261.
17. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 95 (1974).
18. Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate
Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 651,
663 (2002) (discussing "'interdoctrinal legal transplants,' namely, transplants
from one doctrinal area to another, within the same national system" and con-
cluding that "the fit is imperfect because the contexts are different").
19. Miximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The
Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 29 (2004) (stating that "the metaphor of legal
transplant [was] popularized by Alan Watson"); Julie Mertus & Elizabeth
Breier-Sharlow, Power, Legal Transplants and Harmonization, 81 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 477, 479 (2004) (stating that Watson "popularized the term"
legal transplants).
20. WATSON, supra note 17.
21. ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 94 (1938); see
also WATSON, supra note 17, at 22 (quoting this statement by Roscoe Pound).
22. Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 LAW. Q. REV. 79,
79 (1976).
2010]1 605
606 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [94:602
"transplants" in presenting a critical analysis of transfers of le-
gal rules and institutions. 23
Scholars were not the only observers to draw on the trans-
plant metaphor in their discussions of legal transfers. For in-
stance, in a much-cited 1956 judicial opinion, 24 Lord Denning
compared the English common law to an English oak tree and
warned that "[y]ou cannot transplant it to the African continent
and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in Eng-
land. It will flourish indeed but it needs careful tending."25
With the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall and the mass ex-
port of foreign legal models to former Soviet and Eastern Euro-
pean countries,26 this attention to legal transplants only inten-
sified. Comparative law scholars have produced a vast
literature documenting and analyzing legal transplants. They
have offered a plethora of theoretical models to identify the ba-
sic features of and rationales for legal transplants.27 These
scholars have engaged in often heated debate28 over what caus-
23. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37
MOD. L. REV. 1, 27 (1974) ("[W]e cannot take for granted that rules or institu-
tions are transplantable.").
24. Nyali, Ltd. v. Attorney-General, (1956) 1 Q.B. 1 (Eng. A.C.). For ex-
amples of sources citing this opinion, see Christian v. The Queen, (2007) 2 A.C.
400 (Eng. P.C.); Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibili-
ty of a Multilateral Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies
Caught in Between?, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 95, 107 (2005); Richard G.
Small, Towards a Theory of Contextual Transplants, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
1431, 1433 (2005).
25. Nyali, Ltd., 1 Q.B. at 16.
26. For a sampling of the literature, see, for example, Gianmaria Ajani,
By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43
AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 93 (1995) (asserting that post-communist Europe has been
"a large-scale borrower of Western models"); Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?:
United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in
the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 179
(1999) (discussing Central and East European nations' requests for "post-
socialist constitution[s]"); Inga Markovits, Exporting Law Reform-But Will It
Travel?, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 95, 95 (2004) (discussing "the large-scale trans-
fer of Western legal know-how to the post-socialist countries of Eastern Eu-
rope").
27. See infra Part I.
28. See David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in
ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 7, 7-15 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds.,
2001) (discussing the "polemical" debate between "comparativists" and "sociol-
ogists of law" over legal transplants); Joel M. Ngugi, Promissory Estoppel: The
Life History of an Ideal Legal Transplant, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 425, 464 (2007)
(referring to "a raging debate in the literature on whether 'legal transplants'
can be engineered or not"); Small, supra note 24, at 1433-37 (discussing the
"culturalist-transferist debate" over legal transplants and characterizing that
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es such transplants to thrive, perish, or turn "toxic" 29 in foreign
soil.
Thus far, comparative law scholars have focused principal-
ly on legal transplants' impact on the "recipient" country.30 In
so doing, those scholars have missed an equally important phe-
nomenon-the impact of the process on the "donor" country.31
This Article seeks to fill this gap in the literature. It argues
that legal transplants can provide a mirror for donor countries
to see flaws in their own systems and new directions for reform.
Part I presents a critical analysis of comparative law scho-
larship. 32 It demonstrates that scholars have failed to recognize
the significance of legal transplants for donor as well as reci-
pient countries.
The remainder of the Article uses one example-China's
2001 import of the classic "Anglo-American"33 concept of trust-
debate as "arguably a 'dialogue of the deaf"'); see also, e.g., Lawrence Fried-
man, Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants, in ADAPTING LE-
GAL CULTURES, supra, at 93, 97-98 (stating that Alan Watson's "premises are
ludicrous . . . [and] the notions which Watson peddles are not helpful. He leads
us down a blind alley").
29. Rock & Wachter, supra note 18, at 673.
30. Scholars use inconsistent terms to refer to the countries or systems
involved in the legal transplant process. Compare Hans W. Baade, Trans-
plants of Laws and of Lawyers, in JUSTICE IN PARTICULAR: FESTSCHRIFT IN
HONOUR OF PROFESSOR P.J. KOZYRIS (2007) (referring to "source" and "bor-
rower" and "donor and donee"), with Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in
International Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
199, 199 (1994) (referring to "'source' body of law land] . . . 'host' body of law"),
and Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology,
Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51
AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 845 (2003) (referring to "donor" and "recipient").
31. See sources cited supra note 30 (discussing inconsistent terminology).
32. This Article focuses exclusively on English-language comparative law
scholarship on legal transplants. In fact, however, an enormous foreign-
language literature exists as well. For examples of such sources, see FA DE
YIZHI YU FA DE BENTUHUA [TRANSPLANTATION OF LAW AND INDIGENIZATION
OF LAW] (He Qinhua ed., 2001); Wang Yong, Falu Yizhi Yanjiu Yu Dangdai
Zhongguo de Falu Xiandaihua [A Study of Legal Transplants and the Legal
Modernization of China], FAZHI YU SHEHUI FAZHAN, no. 4, 149 (2008).
33. Chinese authors often describe the model for their trust law as "Anglo-
American" [ying mei] law. See, e.g., Li Qunxing, Xintuo de Falu Xingzhi Yu
Jiben Linian [The Legal Nature and the Basic Concept of the Trust], 22 FAXUE
YANJIU, no. 3, 118, 118 (2000) (stating that the trust system "China is intro-
ducing . .. originated in Anglo-American law"); Zheng Ruikun, Xintuo Fa Yu
Wuquan Fa Ding Yuanze de Chongtu Ji Qi Jiejue [The Theoretical Conflict Be-
tween the Trust Law and the Numerus Clausus Principle and its Resolution],
25 ZHENGFA LUNTAN, no. 4, 78 (2007) ("The trust is a legal concept that origi-
nated in Anglo-American law."). Throughout this Article, the Chinese phrase
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to illustrate the advantages of a more balanced study of legal
transplants. Part II describes the research base for this Article.
It shows that China has produced a voluminous and impressive
comparative trust law literature. Comparative law research
and analysis have played a prominent role in the design, dis-
semination, and improvement of China's first Trust Law.
Part II demonstrates that China's comparative trust law li-
terature is important for understanding the trust law model
China transplanted as well as the legislative product of that
transplant. Yet, because nearly all texts are available only in
Chinese, these publications and the lessons they provide have
been inaccessible to those who could most profit from them-
trust law scholars and reformers in the United States. Part III
presents the first study of China's critique of American trust
law. It shows that close analysis of Chinese commentary, legis-
lative history, and statutory text exposes a systemic flaw that
U.S. scholars and reformers should address: inadequate checks
and balances on trustees.
The Article concludes that this finding raises serious ques-
tions about the current direction of American trust law. Rather
than strengthening the traditional legal and moral constraints
on trustees, reformers are actually weakening those con-
straints. Thus, the mirror China provides should inspire refor-
mers to see our trust system as it really is and to abandon their
ill-advised reform agenda.
I. THE LIMITS OF COMPARATIVE LAW SCHOLARSHIP
ON LEGAL TRANSPLANTS
In 1974, Professor Alan Watson made a major contribution
to the field of comparative law by popularizing the term "legal
transplant" and making it "the dominant metaphor for discuss-
ing transformative effects of legal borrowing." 34 In his land-
mark book Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative
Law, 3 5 Professor Watson defined "legal transplants" as "the
moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to anoth-
ying mei is translated literally as "Anglo-American" to emphasize the relev-
ance of Chinese commentary to American trust law.
34. Timothy Webster, Note, Legal Excisions "Omissions Are Not Acci-
dents.," 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 435, 438 (2006); see supra notes 19-25 and ac-
companying text (noting that although Watson was not the first to identify the
legal transplant phenomenon or to use the legal transplant metaphor, he po-
pularized the term).
35. WATSON, supra note 17.
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er, or from one people to another."36 Watson presented a sweep-
ing historical survey37 in which he emphasized the "longevity"
and "frequency" of legal transplants. 38 He traced legal trans-
plants to as early a source as the seventeenth-century B.C. Ba-
bylonian Code of Hammurabi.39 Watson found legal transplants
so "common"40 throughout history that he made what was to
become his most controversial claim4 1 : "borrowing (with adap-
tation) has been the usual way of legal development."42
Professor Watson recognized that legal transplants "come
in all shapes and sizes,"43 including "imposed reception, soli-
cited imposition, penetration,"44 and the like. Yet, he declined
to present a systematic classification of such transfers45 or an
overarching theory of legal transplants. 46 He set a more modest
goal for his study-to provide "individual instances" 47 of legal
transplants and only "general reflections" 48 about the trans-
plant process, its rationales, and its impact on recipient sys-
tems. He left to otherS49 the task of "elaborat[ing] types of
36. Id. at 21.
37. This survey included, inter alia, the influence of Greek law on Roman
law, id. at 76-79, the reception of Roman law in Egypt, id. at 31-35, Scotland,
id. at 36-56, and Holland, id. at 57, and the impact of English law on the Mas-
sachusetts Bay Colony, id. at 65-70, and New Zealand, id. at 71-74.
38. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 107, 112 (2d ed., University of Georgia Press 1993) (1974).
39. WATSON, supra note 17, at 23.
40. Id. at 95.
41. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text (discussing how Wat-
son's theory has sparked a contentious intellectual response). Watson himself
later acknowledged that his "work has been regarded as subversive." WATSON,
supra note 38, at 107.
42. WATSON, supra note 17, at 7.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Id.
45. See id. ("There is, I suggest, no point in elaborating a detailed classifi-
cation of borrowing. . . .").
46. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL CHANGE 90 (1991)
(stating that in his earlier work on legal transplants he "did try to be as atheo-
retical as was consistent with the subject").
47. WATSON, supra note 17, at 30.
48. Id. at 95.
49. Id. at 30. In subsequent work, however, Watson himself has at-
tempted to develop such a theory. For examples of Watson's books and articles
discussing the relationship between law and society and the factors affecting
legal change, see William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of
Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 489 n.1 (1995). Unfortunately,
however, Watson "has presented his theory in a somewhat loose and intuitive
fashion; he has, over time, and in different contexts, changed his formulations,
2010] 609
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transplantation"50 and a theory of legal transplants. 51 As the
next Section shows, comparative law scholars have accepted
this invitation with alacrity.
A. CURRENT APPROACHES TO LEGAL TRANSPLANTS
Alan Watson's book has left an indelible imprint on com-
parative law scholarship. 52 In both American and European
academic circles, it has generated "explosive" interest in legal
transplants. 53 For over three decades, established comparative
law scholars and new voices in the field have applied, extended,
and challenged Watson's analysis and conclusions.
In a vast and ever-growing literature, numerous scholars
have documented the spread of legal transplants across the
globe-to countries as diverse as Argentina, 54 Indonesia,55 Ja-
pan,56 and the United States.57 Several commentators have ac-
sometimes claiming one thing and sometimes another, with the consequence
that his theory has frequently been misunderstood." Id. at 491.
50. WATSON, supra note 17, at 30.
51. Id. As Professor Watson observed in later work, "build[ing] up a
theory of borrowing . .. seems to be an extremely complex matter." Alan Wat-
son, Aspects of Reception of Law, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 335, 335 (1996); see also
Ewald, supra note 49, at 509 ("[Olne must be prepared for the possibility
that ... no satisfactory theory can be given: the phenomena may be too com-
plex for a tidy description, even in principle.").
52. See Ewald, supra note 49, at 490 (recognizing the "great importance"
of Watson's theory to the field of comparative law).
53. JAN SMITS, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: TOWARDS A IUS
COMMUNE EUROPAEUM AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM 60 (Nicole Kornet trans.,
2002) ("Since Alan Watson published his book 'Legal Transplants' in 1974, at-
tention for this phenomenon has experienced an explosive growth in European
and American legal literature.").
54. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 30 (noting different types of transplants
found throughout Argentinean law).
55. See, e.g., Jeremy J. Kingsley, Legal Transplantation: Is This What the
Doctor Ordered and Are the Blood Types Compatible? The Application of Inter-
disciplinary Research to Law Reform in the Developing World-A Case Study
of Corporate Governance in Indonesia, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 506-
10 (2004) (discussing the development of corporate governance law in Indone-
sia).
56. See, e.g., Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-examining Legal
Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51
AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 888 (2003) (analyzing the transplantation of the director's
duty of loyalty in Japanese corporate law); Salil K. Mehra, Same Plant, Differ-
ent Soil: Japan's New Merger Guidelines, 26 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 515, 515-
17 (2006) (examining the creation of merger guidelines in Japanese business
law).
57. See, e.g., Ngugi, supra note 28 (discussing the origins of the American
concept of promissory estoppel).
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cepted Watson's invitation to classify legal transplants. For in-
stance, Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois
Richard have concluded from their comprehensive empirical
study of legal transplants that transplants fall into two broad
categories: "receptive transplants" and "unreceptive trans-
plants."68 Jonathan Miller has offered a more nuanced "typolo-
gy" of legal transplants as "a start towards a systematization
process." 59 Using sociological methodology,60 he identifies four
types of legal transplants, each reflecting different factors that
can "motivate"61 a transplant: "i) the Cost-Saving Transplant;
ii) the Externally-Dictated Transplant; iii) the Entrepreneurial
Transplant; and iv) the Legitimacy-Generating Transplant."62
Other commentators have presented updated and more de-
tailed analyses of the transplant process. Some have focused
principally on the participants in legal transplants-from local
legislatureS63 to international development agencies.64 Others,
like Beverly Moran, have explored "[w]hat makes Western law
attractive to non-Western lawmakers in the first place."6 5 A few
scholars have called attention to geographical limitations in
Watson's analysis. Most notably, Miximo Langer has demon-
strated that Watson's traditional approach to legal transplants
focuses too narrowly on transfers from the center (developed
58. Daniel Berkowitz et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 Am. J. COMP. L.
163, 179-80 (2003). For a critique of this classification as applied to Eastern
Europe, see Markovits, supra note 26, at 97.
59. Miller, supra note 30, at 884.
60. See id. at 842 ("One tool used by a sociologists ... is a typology.").
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Daphne Barak-Erez, An International Community of Legisla-
tures?, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 532, 532 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds.,
2006) ("[T]his chapter focuses on the role of legislatures in the adoption of
models and ideas from foreign statutes.").
64. See Randall Peerenboom, What Have We Learned About Law and De-
velopment? Describing, Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27
MICH. J. INT'L L. 823, 831 (2006) ("The United States also exercises influence
indirectly through international development agencies such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, through international legal re-
gimes such as the World Trade Organization and the UN human rights sys-
tem, and through NGOs."); see also deLisle, supra note 26 (presenting a
comprehensive examination of foreign and international participants in legal
exports, including international development agencies).
65. Beverly I. Moran, Essay, Homogenized Law: Can the United States
Learn from African Mistakes?, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 361, 361 (2001) (detail-
ing the development of legal standards in Eritrea).
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countries) to the periphery (developing countries).66 Based on
his study of Latin American criminal procedure reforms, Pro-
fessor Langer has argued that future analysis of legal transfers
must consider "[d]iffusion of [l]egal [i]deas from the
[p]eriphery" as well.6 7 Gianmaria Ajani has gone further and
called for a comprehensive "dynamic examination" 68 of the legal
transplant process itself to identify and analyze "new fac-
tors . . . , both normative or scholarly," that influence the
process. 69
Watson's book has also ignited a firestorm of criticism.
Some comparative law scholars have denied the very existence
of legal transplants. Thus, Pierre Legrand has proclaimed:
"[R]ules cannot travel. Accordingly, 'legal transplants' are im-
possible." 70 Other commentators have challenged the trans-
plant metaphor as "ambiguous"7 ' and "misleading." 7 2 David
Nelken, for example, has observed that the term could refer to
"plant and forestry transplanting, the transplantation of people
or peoples, or the more recent . .. sense of the term used in
talking about medical transplants." 73 Other critics have argued
66. See Mdximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Proce-
dure: Diffusion of Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 620
(2007) (explaining how his analysis of "diffusion from the periphery" differs
from the existing literature); see also Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, The Im-
port and Export of Law and Legal Institutions: International Strategies in Na-
tional Palace Wars, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, supra note 28, at 241, 246
("The importers and exporters and the academics who write about them tend
to define transplants in terms of the centre moving into the periphery. . .
67. Langer, supra note 66, at 617.
68. Ajani, supra note 26, at 116.
69. Id.
70. Pierre Legrand, What "Legal Transplants"?, in ADAPTING LEGAL CUL-
TURES, supra note 28, at 55, 57; see also ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT 29-36 (1978) (rejecting the argument that laws can be
transferred between nations).
71. Nelken, supra note 28, at 17.
72. Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 12 (1998). For
an example of the misleading effect of the term "legal transplant," see Watson,
supra note 51, at 340 ("In 1977 on his way to the airport, Dr. Carleton Chap-
man bought in New York a copy of Alan Watson's, Legal Transplants, without
much examination. Dr. Chapman was a physician who was interested in law,
and thought the book was about the law relating to medical transplants.").
73. Nelken, supra note 28, at 17-18 (footnote omitted). Randall Peeren-
boom also discusses the different emphases of legal transplant as a botanical
and medical metaphor. Peerenboom, supra note 64, at 826. He states that
"[t]he medical interpretation suggests the transplant will lead to discrete
changes-replacement of one organ-without any overall systemic change; the
recipient is still the same person. The botanical reading suggests the possibili-
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that the metaphor, although "powerful,"74 fails to capture the
complexity of legal transfers. Inga Markovits has shown that
the "horticultural language of transplants does not quite fit the
innovations" in post-socialist Eastern Europe. 75 Professor Ma-
kovits states that those innovations "are not necessarily trans-
plants from the West; they can also be homegrown breeds from
the days of Socialism, now domesticated by rule of law con-
straints and reclaimed for post-socialist use."76 In response to
the perceived flaws of the legal transplant metaphor, scholars
have offered a "host of alternative metaphors and catchy
phrases," 7 including most recently "legal irritants," 78 "legal
formants,"79 and "legal translation."80
At the most extreme, critics, especially sociologists of law,
have denounced Watson's entire enterprise as subversive.81
They claim that Watson's exclusive focus on legal transplants
devalues the role society plays in legal development. 82 These
ty of fundamental system alteration . . . ." Id. In addition, he explains that
"[tihe risk of incompatibility is even clearer when legal transplant is unders-
tood as a medical rather than botanical metaphor. Just as some recipients of
organ transplants may reject incompatible tissue, so too some systems may
reject liberal democratic rule of law or more particular institutional reforms or
practices." Id.
74. Langer, supra note 19, at 30.
75. Markovits, supra note 26, at 103.
76. Id.
77. Peerenboom, supra note 64, at 825. For a detailed comparative analy-
sis of these proposals, see id. at 825-27; Webster, supra note 34, at 438-40.
78. See Teubner, supra note 72, at 12 (stating that "legal irritants" serve
as a more appropriate metaphor than "legal transplants" because the imposi-
tion of foreign rules "irritates law's 'binding arrangements"').
79. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Compara-
tive Law (pt. 1), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 26-34 (1991) (describing the develop-
ment and important features of "legal formants").
80. See Langer, supra note 19, at 32-35 (explaining how the metaphor of
legal translation is a "superior heuristic device" to the metaphor of legal
transplant).
81. See Nelken, supra note 28, at 13 ("For the purpose of undermining so-
ciology of law Watson actually uses his many examples of legal transplants to
show the ease and inevitability of legal transplants.").
82. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 28, at 93 ("Watson seems to feel, and
quite strongly, that there is no particular relationship between law and socie-
ty."). Professor William Ewald has attempted to "reformulate and moderate"
Watson's controversial assertion that legal development is the product of legal
transplants rather than societal forces. Nelken, supra note 28, at 8; see Ewald,
supra note 49, at 491 (explaining that Watson's theory "has been open to so
much misinterpretation"). Professor Ewald argues that two Watsons exist-
the "Strong Watson," who "is a menace to himself and to others," id. at 492,
and the "Weak Watson," who makes "a major theoretical advance
[and] . . . opens the door to [a] new style of comparative law." Id. at 491. Most
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scholars view Watson's work as nothing less than "an attack on
the very possibility of sociology of law."83
Over the past three decades, one question, which Professor
Watson largely ignored, 8 4 has dominated discussion of legal
transplants: "Why do some legal transplants succeed while oth-
ers fail?"85 Recent efforts by Western governments, legal advis-
ers, and international development agencies to spread the "rule
of law" 86 worldwide87 have given this question practical as well
notably, Ewald rejects Watson's "strong" argument that law is insulated from
society as "categorical and ... one-dimensional." Id. at 509. He identifies and
praises the "weak version" of Watson's argument, which only "attempt[s] to
limit the link between law and society." Id. at 510.
The weak version, in contrast, opens the door to a view of law that is
subtler and more nuanced than any of the theories that have hitherto
prevailed. Watson has shown that law does not reduce to economics
(or politics or philosophy or society); but . . . he need not claim that
law is entirely unrelated to these subjects, and this means that he
need not abandon altogether the insights of the great legal thinkers of
the past. . . . But the point is that their ideas must now be coupled
with a cautious awareness of the complexity of the relationship be-
tween law and society, and must be grounded in a deep investigation
of the history of law.
Id. at 509.
83. Nelken, supra note 28, at 8. After publication of Legal Transplants,
Professor Watson only added fuel to the fire with "unacceptably strong state-
ment[s] of his position." Ewald, supra note 49, at 503; see, e.g., ALAN WATSON,
THE EVOLUTION OF LAw 117-18 (1985) (stating that "the direct link between a
society and its law is tenuous" and "[1]aw . . . is above all and primarily the
culture of lawyers and especially of the lawmakers"); Alan Watson, Compara-
tive Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 315 (1978) ('[Llaw devel-
ops by transplanting, not because some such rule was the inevitable conse-
quence of the social structure and would have emerged even without a model
to copy, but because the foreign rule was known to those with control over law
making and they observed the (apparent) benefits which could be derived from
it."); Alan Watson, From Legal Transplants to Legal Formants, 43 Am. J.
COMP. L. 469, 470 (1995) (expressly excluding from his discussion of the signi-
ficance of legal culture "any of the common assumptions about a close connec-
tion between law and society").
84. See David Nelken, The Meaning of Success in Transnational Legal
Transfers, 19 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 349, 352 (2001) ("Watson is
mainly concerned to show that law travels easily between very different con-
texts-whatever happens to it afterwards.").
85. Ngugi, supra note 28, at 495. This question so dominates the litera-
ture that scholars who explore other aspects of legal transplants often explicit-
ly state that they are not considering the impact of transplants. See, e.g.,
Kingsley, supra note 55, at 510 ("The purpose of this section is not to ascertain
whether the legal transplantation of corporate governance has been success-
ful . . . ."); Moran, supra note 65, at 361 (stating that her "[e]ssay moves away
from the question of why Western law fails to thrive in foreign soil and toward
an earlier point in the law making process").
86. This is not meant to suggest that one definition of "rule of law" exists.
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as theoretical significance. Yet, as Hideki Kanda and Curtis
Milhaupt have observed, "[d]espite the importance of trans-
plants to legal development around the world . .. there is little
agreement among scholars on transplant feasibility and the
conditions for successful transplants, or even how to define
'success."'88
Only compounding the problem is scholars' disagreement
as to when to measure a transplant's success. For example,
some scholars evaluate success at the initial stage of the
process-when the transplant is first introduced-while other
scholars focus instead on the later stage-when the transplant
is integrated into the recipient legal culture.89 As David Nelken
has aptly noted, scholars may well reach different conclusions
about a given transplant's success depending on the time frame
they use to assess success.90
Scholars have offered a wide variety of possible explana-
tions for what makes "legal transplants work."91 For example,
some authors have identified "prestige" of the donor and its
model as the principal determinant of a transplant's success or
failure.92 Other scholars, including Professors Kanda and Mil-
As John Reitz has aptly observed, "[t]he rule of law is 'a notoriously contested
concept,' and its precise meaning is subject to much debate." John C. Reitz,
Export of the Rule of Law, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429, 435
(2003) (quoting Martin Krygier, Marxism and the Rule of Law: Reflections Af-
ter the Collapse of Communism, 15 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 633, 640 (1990)). None-
theless, "rule of law" has become the catchphrase of recent foreign legal assis-
tance projects. For a superb, in-depth analysis of efforts to export the rule of
law, see generally id.
87. See deLisle, supra note 26, at 180, for a comprehensive study of "con-
temporary United States efforts to export legal models and provide legal assis-
tance abroad." These efforts are often described as "the revival of law and de-
velopment." Dezalay & Garth, supra note 66, at 245; see Peerenboom, supra
note 64, at 823 ("In the last 20 years, legal reforms and the establishment of
rule of law have once again taken center stage as part of the new law and de-
velopment movement.").
88. Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 56, at 887. Furthermore, "there is little
analysis of how the success or failure of legal transplants relates to the
achievement of larger goals, such as economic development." Id.
89. Webster, supra note 34, at 440 (noting that scholars tend to focus ei-
ther on the moment when a transplant is introduced or when the transplant is
"consequently] digest[ed] within the new state" and calling instead for an ap-
proach that "entertain[s] both aspects of the transplant phenomenon").
90. See Nelken, supra note 84, at 353 (explaining that whether we are
"concerned with how a legal adaptation emerges-the choice of law--or with
the way it exerts its influence-the results of a given transfer" will affect "our
assessment of what 'success' means").
91. Berkowitz et al., supra note 58, at 165.
92. See, e.g., Ajani, supra note 26, at 115 ("Prestige and political opportu-
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haupt, have found the answer instead in the "fit" between the
transplanted rule and the recipient country's prevailing envi-
ronment or reform agenda.93
Numerous authors have offered yet another possible ex-
planation-process. For instance, Professors Berkowitz, Pistor,
and Richard have argued that a transplant is less likely to be
effective "where foreign law is imposed and legal evolution is
external rather than internal."94 Other process-oriented com-
mentators have focused specifically on the actors in legal
transplants-both foreign purveyors of a legal model and local
lawmakers and enforcement institutions. Jacques deLisle, for
example, has linked a transplant's success in part to foreign
advisers' knowledge of the recipient country's language, law,
politics, and culture, as well as "extensive and developed chan-
nels of communication and cooperation with recipient country
institutions and individuals."9 5 Faiz Ahmed has underscored
nity together encourage the spread of models developed by the EU within the
whole Central and Eastern Europe."); Sacco, supra note 79, at 398 ("Usually,
reception takes place because of the desire to appropriate the work of others.
The desire arises because this work has a quality one can only describe as
'prestige."'). The "prestige ... of the local promoters who back the import" may
also be a factor. Peerenboom, supra note 64, at 831 (emphasis omitted).
93. See deLisle, supra note 26, at 289 ("U.S. legal models are more likely
to be emulated . . . when the substance of the U.S. prescriptions or American
templates is relatively compatible with the recipient nation's preexisting sys-
tem or its agenda for legal reform."); Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 56, at 891
("We believe that 'fit' between the imported rule and the host environment is
crucial to the success of a transplant."). But see Dezalay & Garth, supra note
66, at 253 ("[W]e do not believe it is helpful to ask whether the transplant fits
or does not fit the culture."); Nelken, supra note 28, at 47 (noting problems
with the conventional approach of linking the "notion of success ... to showing
how the transferred law (also) fits its new environment"). This possible lin-
kage to the recipient country's reform agenda may make the timing of the
transplant important. See Nelken, supra note 84, at 357 ("[Ijn periods of politi-
cal transition [local reformers] often consciously choose to borrow law from a
very different kind of society.").
94. Berkowitz et al., supra note 58, at 189; see Kingsley, supra note 55, at
511 (stating that transplants may be "undertaken voluntarily or under du-
ress"); Small, supra note 24, at 1439 (stressing the difference between changes
"driven by internal as opposed to external factors"). Critics have often charac-
terized "imposed" transplants as a form of "legal imperialism." See, e.g., JAMES
A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN
LATIN AMERICA (1980) (critiquing the history of American legal assistance to
Latin America); Kingsley, supra note 55, at 521 (stating that the law and de-
velopment movement in which Americans imposed laws was regarded "as an
almost imperialistic venture"); Mertus & Breier-Sharlow, supra note 19, at
479 (describing efforts to impose international trade agreements as a "kind of
legal imperialism").
95. deLisle, supra note 26, at 302.
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the need for local jurists' participation in a legal transplant.96
In support, he cites the Italian government's unilateral effort to
draft a criminal procedure code for Afghanistan "with little or
no Afghan involvement . .. [which] has mired the reception of
this attempted legal transplant."97 Based on his study of recent
Latin American legal reforms, Jorge Esquirol has also empha-
sized the importance of local participation, but at a different
stage-in subsequent implementation of a legal transplant.98
Professor Esquirol has criticized U.S. advisers for "routinely
disparag[ing]" 99 Latin American legal institutions, the very ent-
ities that determine the ultimate success or failure of a legal
transplant.100 The result, he concludes, "is like repeatedly at-
tempting to build a new house while striking repeated blows at
its foundations."' 0 '
Finally, scholars have also suggested that the subject mat-
ter of a legal transplant may have an impact on that trans-
plant's viability. For example, authors have argued that certain
"types of law"102 (e.g., economic laws) may be more successfully
transplanted than others (e.g., family and religious laws). 103
Some scholars have focused attention instead on the political
96. Ahmed, supra note 3, at 287-88 (discussing recent legal reform efforts
in Afghanistan).
97. Id. at 287. For a more extended discussion, see Faiz Ahmed, Judicial
Reform in Afghanistan: A Case Study in the New Criminal Procedure Code, 29
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 93 (2005). Familiarity with the donor's laws
as well as local involvement in the transplant process may also be a factor. See
Berkowitz et al., supra note 58, at 189 (suggesting that transplants are more
likely to succeed where the recipient country's "population is already familiar
with the basic principles of these laws").
98. Jorge L. Esquirol, The Failed Law of Latin America, 56 AM. J. COMP.
L. 75 (2008); see also Markovits, supra note 26, at 99 ("Most law reform, [in-
cluding legal transplants,] requires the cooperation of its citizenry to be effec-
tive.").
99. Esquirol, supra note 98, at 124.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Nelken, supra note 84, at 356.
103. See id. (summarizing such arguments and noting that "more recent
scholarship has complicated the picture by showing the possibility of using law
to transform [private or religious] spheres"); see also deLisle, supra note 26, at
289 (stating as a "substantive lesson of the recent experience of U.S. legal as-
sistance efforts and the export of U.S. legal ideals: compared to 'private' or
'economic' law, constitutions and 'public' or 'political' laws are . . . less readily
transplanted or borrowed across legal systems"). But see Berkowitz et al., su-
pra note 58, at 189 (arguing that "the process of lawmaking rather than the
contents of legal rules determines the effectiveness of legal institutions," in-
cluding institutions introduced by legal transplants).
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content of transplanted doctrines and rules. They claim that le-
gal transplants that involve "'apolitical' prescriptions" 1 0 4 are
more likely to be effective. Economically-minded authors, most
notably Ugo Mattei, 0 5 have offered yet another perspective.
They argue that "the most efficient legal doctrine[s]" and rules
will survive a legal transplant. 106
In sum, in the three decades since the publication of Alan
Watson's book, legal scholars have failed to reach consensus on
the definition, desirability, or viability of legal transplants.
Nonetheless, their work shares a common limitation: the exist-
ing literature has adopted a unidirectional approach, consider-
ing only the implications of a transfer on the recipient coun-
try.10 7
This limitation is not surprising. After all, the transplant
metaphor that dominates scholarly debate-be it horticultural
or medical-makes the very notion of a donor benefiting frorn a
transplant implausible at best. Thus, it is time to go beyond
metaphor to develop a more complete and nuanced theory of le-
gal transplants.
B. BEYOND METAPHOR
Comparative law scholars argue that "one of the greatest
benefits of the study of foreign law is that it makes you rethink
and understand better your own law." 08 Yet, those scholars
104. deLisle, supra note 26, at 302. Some commentators have suggested
that a donor's "apolitical intentions or analyses" may also be a factor.
Kingsley, supra note 55, at 511.
105. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in
Comparative Law and Economics, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994).
106. Id. at 8. But see Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 56, at 900 (challenging
"Mattei's efficiency perspective" and stating that "[w]hile efficient rules may
indeed tend to survive and proliferate outside their home jurisdictions, this
bare fact has little explanatory power in the absence of a fine-grained exami-
nation of how a specific rule fits into the existing legal infrastructure and po-
litical economy of a given system, and the alternatives available to relevant
actors").
107. It should be noted, however, that this literature considers both "the
transformative effects a borrowed legal institution may have on the receiving
country's legal system" and the "role[s] that the recipient legal culture plays in
adapting transplanted law." Webster, supra note 34, at 439.
108. Sir Basil Markesinis, Understanding American Law by Looking at It
Through Foreign Eyes: Toward a Wider Theory for the Study and Use of For-
eign Law, 81 TUL. L. REV. 123, 124 (2006); accord WATSON, supra note 17, at
17 (stating that knowledge of a foreign legal system "will enable . . . [an indi-
vidual] to understand his own system better . . . [and] can also be of the ut-
most practical value . . . to a law reformer seeking improvements for his own
[94:602618
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have missed a rich source of material that could inform that
understanding-the legal transplant process.
Two scholars, Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, arguably
have taken a first step in this direction. In an influential 1998
article, Professors Hansmann and Mattei noted that
"[i]ncreasing numbers of civil law countries" had adopted com-
mon law "trust-like institutions."109 They contended that this
importation of trusts1 o should inspire both common law and
civil law observers to explore a fundamental question that had
largely been ignored in the literature111 : what are "the general
economic functions served by a separate law of trusts?"112 They
then argued that a comparative functional study of trust law
provided revealing insights into the new role of trusts in com-
mon law as well as civil law countries. According to Hansmann
and Mattei, the private trust's "historical role as a device for
intrafamily wealth transfers. . . [has become] relatively trivi-
al."113 In turn, they claimed that the trust now primarily "facili-
tates the partitioning of assets into bundles that can conve-
niently be pledged separately to different classes of
creditors."114
Professors Hansmann and Mattei presented a scathing cri-
tique of both U.S. academic literature and law school curricula
for ignoring this change in the function of trusts.115 They ar-
gued that American trust law scholars and teachers continue to
focus on the historical function of the private trust in promot-
national system"); H. Patrick Glenn, Aims of Comparative Law, in ELGAR EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 57, 63 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006) ("Compara-
tive law could continue to be an aid in simply understanding one's own law.
Domestic law is always in need of improvement, and comparative law can be
useful in this constructive process.").
109. Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Com-
parative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 435 (1998).
110. Hansmann and Mattei also emphasized the historical differences in
common law and civil law treatment of trusts: "In common law jurisdictions,
the trust is among the most important creations of the law of equity . . . . In
the civil law countries, in contrast, the private trust does not exist as a general
form . . . ." Id. They further argued that "[t]he simultaneous existence of these
contrasting regimes naturally raises some basic questions [like]: What is the
role of the law of trusts?" Id.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 437.
113. Id. at 436.
114. Id. at 438. They also argued that "[o]f particular importance in this
respect is the use of trust law to shield trust assets from claims of the trustee's
personal creditors." Id.
115. See id. at 436.
2010]1 619
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ing intrafamily wealth transfers while neglecting the much
more significant "role that private trusts have come to play in
the American capital markets." 116 The authors also attacked
the vast American trust law literature for taking a narrow doc-
trinal approach to trusts rather than adopting a broader func-
tional perspective.117 They argued that comparative study of
the economic functions of trusts would reveal that "the function
of trust law that is the primary subject of the literature in the
common law countries, namely the creation and enforcement of
fiduciary duties . .. [is] a relatively unimportant reason for
maintaining a separate law of trusts."118 The authors thus con-
cluded that a better understanding of trust law functions would
have significant benefits not only for Europeans importing (or
considering importing) trusts, but also for American legal aca-
demics teaching and writing about trusts.119
Professors Hansmann and Mattei have advanced the com-
parative law literature on legal transplants by suggesting that
such transplants can provide lessons for donors as well as reci-
pients. 120 Their analysis has limitations, however. The authors
focus exclusively on adoption of a foreign law, thus ignoring re-
jection.121 They compound the problem by considering only the
"general economic functions" of the transplanted law.122 Final-
ly, they identify just one community of the donor country-the
academic community-that can benefit from study of a legal
transplant.123
The remainder of this Article offers a very different vision
of the transplant process. It shows that the most profound les-
sons for the donor come from identifying what the recipient re-
jected rather than adopted from the donor's model. The Article
demonstrates the advantages of a close analysis of the reci-
pient's specific critique of the donor's system. The Article con-
116. Id.; see also Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United
States. A Basic Study of Its Special Contribution, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 133, 133
(1998) (stating that this focus on the historical role of trusts is "a rather tech-
nical and narrow ground to approach our topic").
117. Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 109, at 435 (criticizing the "extensive
legal literature on the institution of the trust [as] . . . tend[ing] to be doctrinal
rather than broadly functional in perspective").
118. Id. at 438.
119. Id. at 435-37 (discussing the benefits of a "better understanding of the
functions of trust law").
120. See id.
121. See id. at 435-36.
122. Id. at 437.
123. See id. at 435-36.
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cludes that the legal transplant process can provide a new ana-
lytical framework or mirror for legal reformers from every walk
of life-legislators, judges, practitioners, and scholars alike-to
see concrete flaws in their own system and possible new direc-
tions for reform.
II. THE CHINESE MIRROR: CHINA'S COMPARATIVE
TRUST LAW LITERATURE
On April 28, 2001, the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.),
a country with a socialist, civil law-based legal system, adopted
that quintessential common law institution: the trust.124 Chi-
na's Trust Law came complete with provisions an American es-
tate planner would recognize 125-testamentary trusts, 126 cy
pres, 127 spendthrift protections, 128 fiduciary commingling, 129
and self-dealing.13 0 Chinese drafters and commentators openly
acknowledge the law's foreign origins. The authors of the first
annotated commentary on China's Trust Law expressed this
view best in a horticultural metaphor all too familiar to com-
parative law scholars. 13 1 They described the law as a "'fruit
tree' that has come across the ocean to another shore, [which] if
124. Xintuo Fa [Trust Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., Apr. 28, 2001, effective Oct. 1, 2001) ST. COUNCIL GAZ., July
20, 2001, at 16 [hereinafter 2001 Trust Law]. For a superb overview of the
Chinese Trust Law, see generally LUSINA Ho, TRUST LAW IN CHINA (2003); see
also Frances H. Foster, The Dark Side of Trusts: Challenges to Chinese Inhe-
ritance Law, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 151, 154-56 (2003) (presenting
a critical analysis of the Trust Law). Strictly speaking, China's legal system
included limited provisions on trusts prior to the 2001 Trust Law. See Walter
Hutchens, The PRC's First Trust Law: Trusts Without Chinese Characteris-
tics?, CHINA L. & PRAc., June 2001, at 18, 18 (citing provisions on entrustment
contracts in the 1999 Contract Law and regulations on financial trust compa-
nies). Yet, "no prior statute spelled out the basic parameters of trust relation-
ships, and courts often struggled to determine the right standards to apply."
Id.
125. This is not meant to suggest, however, that the Chinese provisions are
identical to their American counterparts. See, e.g., WANG QING & GUO CE,
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINTUO FA TIAOWEN QUANSHI [ANNOTATED
ARTICLES OF THE TRUST LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 164-66
(2001) (discussing differences between the Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and
Anglo-American versions of the "cy pres principle" for charitable trusts).
126. 2001 Trust Law, supra note 124, art. 13.
127. Id. art. 72.
128. Id. arts. 47-48.
129. Id. art. 29.
130. Id. art. 28.
131. WANG QING & GUO CE, supra note 125, at 1 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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altered to fit China's water and soil, can produce 'clusters of
fruit."'132
The P.R.C. Trust Law has generated a vast Chinese-
language literature. 133 These materials constitute the principal
research base for this Article's examination of China's critique
of American trust law. Part II.A presents an overview of the
Chinese trust law literature. It shows that Chinese authors
have relied heavily on foreign texts and commentary. They
have produced a voluminous and sophisticated comparative law
literature that provides Chinese and foreign scholars invalua-
ble insights into China's transplantation and adaptation of for-
eign trust law.
A. SOURCES FOR STUDYING CHINA'S LEGAL TRANSPLANT
Chinese lawmakers and commentators have produced a
broad array of materials on the P.R.C. Trust Law. These
sources run the gamut from official statutory texts and legisla-
tive history 3 4 to online discussions of the law.135 Chinese scho-
lars have published scores of books, 13 6 law review articles, 3 7
132. Id. See also supra Part I, for a broader discussion of how the trans-
plant metaphor is used in comparative law literature.
133. Chinese publications with both Chinese-language text and English-
language translations include, for example, ZHONGGUO XINTUo FA-QI CAO
ZILIAO HUIBIAN [THE CHINESE TRUST LAW-MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING
PROCESS] (Zhu Shaoping & Ge Yi eds., 2002) [hereinafter MATERIALS ON THE
DRAFTING PROCESS] (publishing both Chinese-language and English-language
versions of papers and documents discussed at a 2000 international sympo-
sium in Chengdu, China on the draft Chinese Trust Law); Bian Yaowu,
Zhongguo Xintuo Falu Zhidu [The Trust Legal System of China], ZHONGGUO
FALU, Apr. 2003, at 4-7 (providing article in original Chinese); id. at 53-58
(providing English translation of article). A few purely English-language
sources exist as well. For examples of such works by Chinese and foreign scho-
lars, see LUSINA HO, supra note 124, at 1; Foster, supra note 124, at 152;
Charles Zhen Qu, The Doctrinal Basis of the Trust Principles in China's Trust
Law, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 345, 345 (2003); Zhenting Tan, The Chi-
nese Law of Trusts: A Compromise Between Two Legal Systems, 13 BOND L.
REV. 224, 224 (2001).
134. See, e.g., 2001 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 307-25
(publishing the 2001 text of the Chinese Trust Law and documents on the
trust law drafting process).
135. See, e.g., Richard Qiang Guo, A Look at China's New Trust Law, CHI-
NA ONLINE, Aug. 17, 2001 (on file with author). Numerous commentaries ap-
pear in the print media as well. See, e.g., Zhang Xiaocai, Bu Liaojie Xin Xintuo
Ni Hui Sunshi Hen Duo [If You Do Not Understand the New Trusts You Stand
to Lose a Lot], RENMIN RIBAO, May 27, 2001, http://www.peopledaily.com
.cn/GB/jinjil34/168/20010527/475481.html.
136. See, e.g., CHEN XIANGCONG, XINTUo FALU ZHIDU YANJIU [RESEARCH
ON THE TRUST LEGAL SYSTEM] (2007) (providing an overview of legal theory
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conference papers, 13 8 and even doctoral dissertations 139 on trust
law topics. These works include both general discussions of the
origins, development, and basic features of trusts 140 and in-
depth studies of specific aspects of trust law, such as the trus-
tee's duty of prudent investment,141 contractual trusts,142 defi-
nitions of trust property,143 and modification and termination of
trusts.144
and practice on trusts); SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, XINTUO FA [TRUST LAW]
(1999) (providing a comparative analysis of Anglo-American, Chinese, Japa-
nese, Korean, and Taiwanese trust law).
137. See, e.g., Lusina Ho, Xintuo Lifa Bu Yi Cao Zhi Guoji [Trust Legisla-
tion Should Not Be Acted Upon in Undue Haste], 1 BEIDA FALU PINGLUN 618
(1998); Geng Lihang, Xintuo Caichan Wei Zhongguo Xintuo Fa [Trust Property
and China's Trust Law], MIN SHANG FAXUE, no. 5, 2 (2004).
138. See, e.g., MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 133, at
259-61; Zhou Xiaoming, Partner, Beijing Jun Ze Jun Law Firm, Presentation
at the 2001 China Trust Forum: Corporate Governance in Trust Industry
(Sept. 8, 2001) (on file with author).
139. See, e.g., ZHANG TIANMAN, SHIQU HENGPING FA DE XINTUO [TRUSTS
WITHOUT EQUITY] (2004); ZHOU XIAOMING, XINTUO ZHIDU DE BIJIAO FA YAN-
JIU [COMPARATIVE LAW RESEARCH OF TRUST SYSTEMS] (1996) (providing anal-
ysis based on the author's doctoral dissertation of basic principles of trust law
and the role of trusts in both society and culture); Zhenting Tan, Perfecting
the Chinese Law of Trusts: Critical and Comparative Study of the Australian
and Chinese Law of Trusts (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Bond Uni-
versity) (on file with Bond University), available at http://epublications
.bond.edu.aultheses/tan (identifying deficiencies in Chinese trust law through
a comparative analysis of Chinese trust law and Australian trust law).
140. See, e.g., Li Qunxing, supra note 33, at 118; Luo Dajun, Xintuo Falu
Guanxi Tanxi [An Inquiry and Analysis of the Trust Legal Relationship],
ZHENGFA LUNTAN, Apr. 2001, at 70 (providing an inquiry into the nature of
trust law).
141. See, e.g., Huang Suping, Lun Xintuo Shoutuoren de Jinshen Touzi Yi-
wu-Yi Meiguo "Tongyi Jinshen Touzi Ren Fa" Wei Shijiao [On the Trustee's
Duty of Prudent Investment-From the Perspective of the American "Uniform
Prudent Investor Act'], ZHENGZHI YU FALU, no. 9 (2008); Zhou Yi, Lun Xintuo
Shoutuoren de Jinshen Touzi Yiwu [Discussing the Trustee's Duty of Prudent
Investment], ZHANGZHOU SHIFANG XUEYUAN XUEBAO, no. 2 (2002) (on file
with author).
142. See, e.g., Zhang Chun, Xintuo Hetong Lun [On Trust Contracts],
ZHONGGUO FAXUE, no. 3, 93 (2004).
143. See, e.g., Geng Lihang, supra note 137; Li Qunxing, Lun Xintuo Cai-
chan [On Trust Property], FAXUE PINGLUN, no. 1, 77, 77 (2000); Zhong Rui-
dong, Xintuo Caichan Quan, Xintuo Fa Yu Minfa Dian [Trust Property Rights,
Trust Law and Civil Code], GANSU ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO, Mar. 2007, at
71, 71.
144. See, e.g., Xu Wei, Woguo 'Xintuo Fa" Di Wu Zhang Ruogan Quexian
Xin Kui [A New View of Certain Defects in Chapter 5 of the Chinese "Trust
Law'], ZHENGFA LUN CONG, June 10, 2006, at 47, 47.
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For the foreign observer, the most striking feature of the
Chinese literature is its extensive reference to foreign law
texts, theory, and practice.145 Chinese authors have drawn on a
wide variety of foreign legal primary and secondary sources.
Apparently, no country's trust materials are off-limits. Even
Taiwanese texts and commentaries are discussed at length in
the P.R.C. literature.146 Chinese authors cite, often with ap-
proval, statutory provisions from Taiwan's 1996 Trust Law. 147
Moreover, in what one Chinese drafter aptly proclaimed "a very
significant event,"148 a P.R.C. press actually republished on the
Mainland a book on Taiwan's Trust Law authored by two Tai-
wanese scholars.149
Chinese studies of American trust law illustrate the ex-
traordinary range of materials used by Chinese scholars. Au-
thors cite U.S. federal' 50 and state151 legislation and model
codes, including the Uniform Probate Code,152 Uniform Trust
145. See, e.g., Huo YUFEN, XINTUO FA YAO LUN [ESSENTIALS OF TRUST
LAW] 3-27, 278-306 (2003) (discussing English, American, Japanese, and Ko-
rean trust laws with an appendix of Chinese translations of Japanese and Ko-
rean trust laws); YU WEIMING, XINTUO SHOUTUOREN YANJIU [RESEARCH ON
THE TRUSTEE] 1-5 (2007) (discussing the concept of trust in England, the
United States, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, France, and Germany); ZHONG RUI-
DONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, XINTUO FA [TRUST LAW] 44 (2004) (discussing and
citing materials on English, French, and German law); "ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO XINTUo FA" TIAOWEN SHIYI [EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES OF
THE "TRUST LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA"] 209 (Hu Jihua &
Zhang Guilong eds., 2001) [hereinafter EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES] (con-
trasting the definitions of "charitable purpose" in American, English, Japa-
nese, and Korean trust laws).
146. P.RC. authors often refer to Taiwan as a "region" of China rather than
a separate country. See, e.g., WANG QING & GUO CE, supra note 125, at 54 (re-
ferring to "Article 32 of the 'Trust Law' of China's Taiwan region").
147. See, e.g., CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 163 (discussing Tai-
wan's provision on "trust supervisors").
148. Preface to LAI YUANHE & WANG ZHICHENG, XIANDAI XINTUO FA LUN
[A DISCUSSION OF CURRENT TRUST LAW] 1 (2002) [hereinafter Preface to LAI
YUANHE & WANG ZHICHENGJ.
149. LAI YUANHE & WANG ZHICHENG, supra note 148. This book has been
cited by Chinese scholars. See, e.g., CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 31
nn.1-3 (citing LAI YUANHE & WANG ZHICHENG, supra).
150. See, e.g., ZHANG TIANMAN, supra note 139, at 213-19, 309 (discussing
provisions from the Internal Revenue Code and Employee Retirement Income
Security Act).
151. See, e.g., SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, supra note 136, at 178, 187 (cit-
ing Alabama and Washington legislation); Zhou Yi, supra note 141, at 31 (cit-
ing Arizona legislation).
152. See, e.g., ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 90 (discussing model
codes, including the Uniform Probate Code).
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Code, 153 and Uniform Prudent Investor Act. 154 They discuss
such classic U.S. trust cases as Harvard College v. Amory.155
For background material, they draw heavily on Restatements
of Trusts, 1 5 6 treatises by leading trust scholars, 5 7 American
law school casebooks,s58 and Corpus Juris Secundum.159 They
turn to Black's Law Dictionary for the definitions of American
legal terms.16 0 Chinese authors demonstrate familiarity with
153. See, e.g., Dong Xinzhong, Shi Lun Xintuo Shoutuoren Jinshen Yiwu de
Biaozhun [An Examination of the Standard of a Trustee's Duty of Prudence],
23 ZHONGBEI DAXuE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUE BAN), no. 1, 20, 21 (2007) (dis-
cussing section 804 of the Uniform Trust Code and accompanying comment);
Zhang Junjian, Xintuo Fa Zhong Dui Di San Ren de Zeren Zhi Yanjiu [A
Study of Liability to Third Parties Under the Trust Law], 4 JINAN XUEBAO
(ZHEXUE SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) 80, 81 (2007) (citing section 816 of the UNIFORM
TRUST CODE).
154. See, e.g., ZHANG TIANMAN, supra note 139, at 89 (citing section 1(6) of
the UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT); Huang Suping, supra note 141 (dis-
cussing at length the American Uniform Prudent Investor Act).
155. See YU WEIMING, supra note 145, at 153 (discussing Harvard College
v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830)); Zhou Yi, supra note 141, at 23
(same); ZHANG TIANMAN, supra note 139, at 228-41 (discussing major U.S.
cases on offshore asset protection trusts, including Portnoy v. Marine Midland
Bank (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Affordable Media, LLC (Anderson), 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999);
and Lawrence v. Goldberg (In re Lawrence), 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002)).
156. See, e.g., EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES, supra note 145, at 209 (dis-
cussing section 368 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts); ZHANG TIANMAN,
supra note 139, at 89 (citing section 228 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS: the "Prudent Investor Rule"); Geng Lihang, supra note 137, at 9 (cit-
ing sections 17, 177, 178, 222 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS).
157. See, e.g., SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, supra note 136, at 125 nn.1-2
(citing GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 304, 343 (6th ed. 1987)); ZHANG TIANMAN,
supra note 139, at 45 n.1, 395 n.3 (citing PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ADMINISTRATION 353 (2d ed. 1994) and AUSTIN W. SCOTT,
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 612-13 (1960)); Li Qunxing, supra note
33, at 119 (citing EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR., TRUSTS 1 (1990)); Zhang Chun,
Woguo Xintuo Fa Zhong de Guize Chongtu Ji Qi Jiaozheng [Conflicts Among
Regulations in the Chinese Trust Law and Addressing Them], SHEHUI KEXUE
YANJIU, no. 5, 77, 79 (2008) (citing ROGER W. ANDERSON, UNDERSTANDING
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 83 (3d ed. 2003)).
158. See, e.g., ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 110 n.3 (citing EUGENE
F. SCOLES & EDWARD C. HALBACH, JR., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECE-
DENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 300-70 (3d ed. 1981)).
159. Li Qunxing, supra note 143, at 78 n.7 (citing 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 180);
Zhang Chun, supra note 142, at 95 n.2 (citing 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 93-d).
160. See, e.g., ZHANG TIANMAN, supra note 139, at 220 n.1 (citing BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 594-95 (5th ed. 1979)); Zhang Chun, Woguo Xintuo Caichan
Suoyou Quan Guishu de Taidu Ji Qi Fali Shenshi [The Chinese Approach to
Ownership Rights in Trust Property and the Jurisprudential View of that Ap-
proach], 9 GANSU ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO 7, 8 (2007) (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1313 (5th ed. 1979)).
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American legal scholarship as well. For example, recently they
have addressed numerous articles by Professor John Lang-
bein 6 and the very article discussed abovel 62-Henry Hans-
mann's and Ugo Mattei's 1998 comparative study of the eco-
nomic functions of trusts. 163
Chinese trust law scholars have stressed the importance of
combining theoretical study with field research abroad. For ex-
ample, a Chinese doctoral student reported that in order to un-
derstand "the role of trusts and their relationship to society and
culture" 164 he traveled to "Japan, Hong Kong, and America and
other nations and regions"' 6 to observe, firsthand, foreign trust
law in action. A few scholars have expanded their knowledge of
foreign trust systems through graduate study abroad.166
Chinese trust law specialists have also acquired knowledge
of other countries' trust systems through direct contacts with
foreign colleagues. For example, in 2000, the Financial and
Economic Committee of the National People's Congress
(N.P.C.) 167 co-sponsored 168 an international symposium that
brought together trust law experts from Mainland China, Hong
Kong, Australia, France, and Germany. 169 Similarly, a Chinese
drafter and scholar revealed that he had "consulted [his] Tai-
wanese colleagues" because trust law drafters on "the two
161. See, e.g., ZHANG TIANMAN, supra note 139, at 282 n.1 (discussing and
citing John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: Trust as an Instrument
of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165 (1997)); Geng Lihang, supra note 137, at 13
n.1 (discussing and citing John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the
Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 642 (1995)).
162. See supra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Zhou Yi, supra note 141, at 1, 5 (discussing and citing Hans-
mann & Mattei, supra note 109). See also Geng Lihang, supra note 137, at 14
(listing Hansmann & Mattei, supra, in the bibliography).
164. ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 1.
165. Id. The author also conducted field research in China. He went to
"various areas like Shenzhen, Hainan Island, Shandong, and Shanghai and
investigated the trust industry there." Id.
166. See, e.g., Zhenting Tan, supra note 139. This dissertation was written
by Zhenting Tan, who was awarded a Ph.D. from Bond University in Austral-
ia.
167. The National People's Congress is China's national legislature.
168. The N.P.C.'s Financial and Economic Committee cosponsored the
symposium with "the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit
(GTZ) GmbH (German Technical Co operation [sic] Corporation, GTZ), acting
on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment." Zhu Shaoping, Immanuel Gebhardt & Holger Hanisch, Preface to
MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 133, at 259, 259.
169. See MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 133, at 622-27
(listing "Resumes of the Contributors to the Symposium").
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shores of the [Taiwan] Strait . .. were confronting questions
that were fundamentally the same."17 0
B. THE ROLE OF COMPARATIVE LAW RESEARCH IN THE
EVOLUTION OF CHINESE TRUST LAW
The Chinese trust law literature offers invaluable insights
into a legal transplant in action-China's efforts to transplant
foreign trust law. That literature provides a research base to
study the two stages identified by comparative law scholars of
legal transplants: (1) the initial process of selecting and intro-
ducing a foreign model and (2) the subsequent process of adapt-
ing and integrating the model. 171 This Section shows that in
both stages, Chinese participants in the transplant process
have drawn extensively on comparative law research and anal-
ysis of foreign trust law sources.
1. Impact on the Drafting Process
The Chinese trust law literature confirms the claim of
comparative law scholars that the "borrowing" of foreign legal
institutions and rules can be a fertile source of legal develop-
ment.172 From the start, foreign texts and commentaries have
been an integral part of China's efforts to draft its first trust
law. Indeed, in August 1993, the N.P.C. launched the process
with a "draft workshop,"173 in which participants "translated
and collated a large amount of material on the trust systems
and legislation of relevant countries."174 The impetus and goals
for the P.R.C. Trust Law also reflected this foreign influence.
According to Chinese drafters and scholars, the initial impetus
for the legislation was the urgent need to promote China's ac-
cession to the World Trade Organization 75 and to address Chi-
170. Preface to LAI YUANHE & WANG ZHICHENG, supra note 148, at 1.
171. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 17, 21, 35-42 and accompanying text (providing ex-
amples of this claim by legal scholars).
173. Fin. & Econ. Comm. of the Nat'l People's Congress, Xinxi Beijing Ji
Zhuyao Taolun Wenti [Background Information and Main Issues for Discus-
sion], in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 133, at 175, 176
[hereinafter Background Information].
174. EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES, supra note 145, at 2.
175. See, e.g., LUSINA Ho, supra note 124, at 1 n.1 ("[In] June 2000 ... the
draft law was submitted to the [National People's] Congress . . . as part of
China's efforts to establish modern legal and financial infrastructures in antic-
ipation of its entry into the World Trade Organization."); Preface to LAI
YUANHE & WANG ZHICHENG, supra note 148, at 1 (stating that the Trust Law
was adopted "for the purpose of joining the WTO").
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na's troubled financial sector176 by adopting "an important pil-
lar of the modern financing industry in developed countries,"
the trust.177 Chinese authors cite other, less immediate goals as
well, again drawn from their familiarity with foreign expe-
riences. They point out that the trust is such a "flexible" 78 de-
vice overseas that it promises to respond to the increasing
wealth of Chinese citizens,179 promote "family responsibility," 8 0
and expand the charitable sector.181
176. Wang Lianzhou, Xintuo Fa Chutai, Buyi Zai Tou [The Trust Law
Should Not Be Delayed Any Longer], in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING
PROCESS, supra note 133, at 17 (stating that the enactment of the Trust Law
is "absolutely essential in order to create an effective legal basis and sound
legislative environment to guide the liquidation and rectification of trust and
investment companies"); see also LUSINA HO, supra note 124, at 3 ("In particu-
lar, the primary motivation that initiated the drafting process in 1993 was to
use the Trust Law to regulate China's trust and investment companies . . . .");
Preface to LAI YUANHE & WANG ZHICHENG, supra note 148, at 1 (stating that
the principal goal for the Trust Law was "to regulate commercial trusts' activi-
ties"). For extended discussion of the multitude of problems that plagued Chi-
na's trust industry, see LUSINA HO, supra note 124, at 3-14; Wang Qiao, Xin-
tuo Ye Huhuan Xintuo Lifa [Trust Industry Is Calling for Trust Legislation], in
MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 133, at 59.
177. Wang Lianzhou, supra note 176, at 15.
178. WANG QING & GUO CE, supra note 125, at 1 ("Because the flexibility of
the trust for management of property is without parallel in other legal sys-
tems, Japan, Korea, and other countries with the civil law system have also
introduced it and enacted trust laws."); Li Qunxing, supra note 33, at 118
("[Fllexibility ... has made the trust system a worldwide trend.").
179. Luo Dajun, supra note 140, at 70 ("Trust law is an important constitu-
ent part of the legal systems of many countries in the world. It is an essential
prerequisite for societies' legal systems to promote increasing the wealth of
society . . . ."); Wang Lianzhou, supra note 176, at 15 (noting the need for a
trust law to respond to the "increase in individuals' income"); see also Bian
Yaowu, The Trust Legal System, ZHONGGUO FALU, no. 2, 53, 53 (2003) (stating
that "the establishment of the Chinese trust legal system," promulgated by the
recent enactment of the Trust Law, "has met the needs of the society and indi-
viduals for property management with growing wealth"). Two German experts
who were consulted in the drafting process report that "[t]he second field for
which trusts are used elsewhere in the world, namely creating a legal possibil-
ity for well off citizens to perpetuate their ideas of how their assets should be
managed and used . . . increasingly moved into the spotlight the longer the
drafting process continued" in part because "the re-emergence of private for-
tunes in the PRC is giving rise to the wish for more flexible possibilities for the
management and inheritance of these fortunes." Immanuel Gebhardt & Holg-
er Hanisch, Development of the Chinese Trust Law-an Overview, in MATE-
RIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 133, at 262, 268.
180. Guanyu Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Xintuo Fa Caoan Yantao Hui
Zongjie [Summary Report of the Symposium on the Draft Trust Law of the
People's Republic of China], in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra
note 133, at 169, 169 [hereinafter Summary Report] (stating that China needs
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Chinese access to foreign trust law materials and experts
also played a prominent role in the drafting process. Drafters
carefully evaluated common law and civil law legislation and
commentary, both European and Asian. For instance, Professor
Jiang Ping reported that he had examined and discussed with
his fellow drafters the trust law systems of Japan, the United
States, and Hong Kong.182
Foreign trust law specialists were among the cast of thou-
sands involved in writing, reviewing, and revising the P.R.C.
Trust Law.183 German law professor Stefan Grundmann is a
prime example. He provided drafters an overview of German
trust law and practice; 184 a critical analysis of draft Chinese
provisions on trust property, charitable trusts, and trust com-
panies;185 and a Model Trust Law, complete with annotated
commentary.186
In addition, Chinese debates over Trust Law provisions of-
ten referenced foreign models. The debate over whether Chi-
nese legislation should include specific provisions on settlors'
rights is illustrative. During the process of "soliciting opi-
a trust law in part because "the trust is an ideal mechanism to promote family
responsibility").
181. CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 303 (stating that the Trust Law,
specifically its provision for a supervisor of charitable trusts, "promot[es] the
healthy development of charitable work"); Zhang Xiao, Xintuo Lifa Guocheng
de Beijing Jieshao [Background Information on the Drafting Process], in MA-
TERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 133, at 11, 11 ("[A] trust sys-
tem . . . is of great significance for . . . developing social organizations that
benefit the public through poverty relief, education, public health[,] etc. . . . .").
182. Jiang Ping, Foreword to ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 2; see
Zhenting Tan, supra note 133, para. 10 ("During the second stage of making
the Chinese law of trusts, the [N.P.C.] Legal Committee adopted the expe-
riences of Japan and Taiwan, which had legislated their law of trusts and law
of trust businesses respectively.").
183. EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES, supra note 145, at 60 (reporting that
drafters consulted scholars from the United States, England, and Japan in
drafting Article 2 of the Trust Law, the provision that defines "trust"); Back-
ground Information, supra note 173, at 180 (stating that drafters "discussed
[the draft Trust Law] many times with foreign trust law experts").
184. Stefan Grundmann, Overview on German Trust Industry and Trust
Law, in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 133, at 394.
185. Stefan Grundmann, Comments on Chapter III-Trust Property, in
MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 133, at 462; Stefan
Grundmann, Comments on Chapter VI-Special Provisions for Trusts for Pub-
lic Beneficiaries, in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra note 133, at
490.
186. Stefan Grundmann, Model Trust Law, in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFT-
ING PROCESS, supra note 133, at 570.
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nions"187 on early drafts of the Trust Law, considerable disa-
greement arose as to whether China should follow the lead of
common law countries and limit a settlor's rights after estab-
lishment of a trust or, instead, adopt the approach of "civil law
countries' trust laws [, which] . . . recognize that the settlor has
a series of [such] rights"188 even after establishment of a trust.
As will be discussed below, 189 China ultimately chose and ex-
tended the latter approach.
Finally, throughout the drafting process, Chinese commen-
tators used foreign experience to identify the potential legal
and practical challenges China faces in introducing and imple-
menting a trust system. Several Chinese authors emphasized
potential conflicts between the draft Trust Law and other Chi-
nese legislation or legal concepts. For example, Hong Kong
University professor Lusina Ho raised the issue of whether
Marriage Law provisions on jointly owned marital property "in-
clude property one spouse owns as a trustee" or beneficiary.190
Drawing on Louisiana precedent, 191 she predicted that "lengthy
litigation" 192 could ensue if China does not resolve this ques-
tion. 193 Other commentators called attention to likely enforce-
187. ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 89. Drafters
solicited opinions from a wide range of organizations and institutions. See
Zhang Xuwu, Quanguo Ren Da Falu Weiyuanhui Guanyu "Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Xintuo Fa (Caoan)" Shenyi Jieguo de Baogao [Report on the Re-
sults of the Examination of the "(Draft) Trust Law of the People's Republic of
China" by the Legal Committee of the National People's Congress] (Apr. 24,
2001) [hereinafter Examination Report], in 2001 STANDING COMM. NAT'L
PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 323, 323-25 (reporting that the N.P.C. Legal Committee
solicited the views of "different regions, governmental departments, related
research institutions, departments of trust organizations, . . . financial institu-
tions, ... legal specialists [and] N.P.C. Standing Committee members").
188. ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 88-89. For
examples of other debates, see ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 203-04
(discussing the debate over whether China's trust law should cover both "cor-
porate and non-corporate trusts"); see also Examination Report, supra note
187, at 323-25 (providing numerous examples of debates over the scope, goals,
and wording of the Trust Law).
189. See infra Part III.A.
190. Lusina Ho, supra note 137, at 634.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See id. There are other possible conflicts. See id. at 633-35 (discussing
conflicts with, inter alia, the Chinese Civil Code, Inheritance Law, and Com-
pany Law); Zhenting Tan, supra note 133, para. 59 ("[C]onflicts between the
two laws [the Law of Donation to Charitable Businesses and the Trust Law]
will be unavoidable in judicial practice. Therefore, how to reconcile the two
laws will be hard work to do in the future."); Zhao Ming, Woguo Xintuo Zhidu
de Jianli Yu Xibu Da Kaifa [Establishment of a Trust System in China and the
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ment problems China faces in introducing a foreign trust sys-
tem. For instance, in his 1996 doctoral dissertation, a Trust
Law drafter, Zhou Xiaoming, stressed the dominant role of the
judiciary in common law trust systems. 194 He contrasted that
approach with the practical reality that "because China has on-
ly recently adopted the rule of law, the prestige of [Chinese]
judges is relatively low."195 Finally, commentators on Chinese
Trust Law drafts warned of possible problems that could arise
due to inconsistencies between foreign-derived statutory provi-
sions and Chinese cultural tradition. Indeed, some authors con-
cluded that the very concept of the trust may be fundamentally
incompatible with China's "cultural emphasis on the collective"
rather than "individual freedom."196
In sum, the Chinese trust law literature shows that the
2001 P.R.C. Trust Law was first and foremost a legal trans-
plant. Chinese scholars and lawmakers consulted foreign
precedent, texts, commentaries, and experts both in their origi-
nal decision to introduce the foreign trust model and in their
subsequent design of legislative provisions. 197 In documenting
this initial stage of China's legal transplant process, the litera-
ture also provides some preliminary answers to questions
raised in the comparative law scholarship on legal trans-
plants. 198
For example, the Chinese experience offers insights into
what makes a Western model attractive to non-Western law-
makers in the first place. 199 The Chinese literature suggests
that P.R.C. drafters turned to the Western trust law model for
two main reasons. First, that model appeared consistent with
Development of the West], in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra
note 133, at 43, 47 (discussing conflicts between the Trust Law and civil and
commercial regulations).
194. See ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 204.
195. Id.; see also Richard Qiang Guo, supra note 135 ("The politically de-
pendent judiciaries and historically weak legal enforcement may compound
the difficulties in implementation of the novel concept of fiduciary duty."). A
related problem is the lack of familiarity with trust law. E.g., Jiang Ping, su-
pra note 182, at 1 ("Many people have either no knowledge of the trust law
system, or little knowledge, or erroneous knowledge.").
196. SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, supra note 136, at 54; see also ZHONG
RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 89 ("In the process of solicit-
ing opinions [on the draft Trust Law], many people argued that if the settlor
lost the related rights after transferring his property to the trust, this would
not conform to Eastern cultural traditions and customs.").
197. See supra notes 150-70, 172-74, 182-88 and accompanying text.
198. For extended discussion of this literature, see supra Part I.
199. Cf. Moran, supra note 65, at 361 (posing this question).
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many of China's key reform objectives. 200 Most notably, Chinese
scholars and lawmakers argued that adoption of a trust law
could promote WTO accession, regulate China's failing finan-
cial institutions, and provide a property management mechan-
ism for an increasingly wealthy Chinese population. 201
Second, the trust law literature also indicates that Chinese
lawmakers sought to join a "worldwide trend."2 0 2 Commenta-
tors emphasized that, although the trust concept originated in
medieval England, it has since been accepted by all major eco-
nomically developed countries, 203 including China's Asian
neighbors, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. 204 Moreover, they sug-
gested that trust law is no longer simply a matter of domestic
concern; with globalization, trust law is rapidly becoming a
"global legal system."2 0 5
Similarly, the Chinese trust law literature may help ad-
dress the dominant question in the comparative law scholar-
ship on legal transplants: What makes a transplant succeed?206
Although it would be premature at this point to assess the suc-
cess of China's trust law transplant, close analysis of the Chi-
nese literature reveals that several of the factors comparative
law scholars have identified as indicators of a successful trans-
plant were in fact present at the first stage of China's trans-
plant process. 2 07 For instance, as discussed above, 208 Chinese
200. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 175-77, 179 and accompanying text.
202. Li Qunxing, supra note 33, at 118.
203. Zhou Xiaoming, Queli Xintuo Zhidu de Xianshi Yiyi [The Practical
Significance of Establishing a Trust System], in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING
PROCESS, supra note 133, at 21, 21; see also Luo Dajun, supra note 140, at 71
("Over the past few decades, the trust system has been rapidly developed in all
countries that are economically developed.").
204. See supra notes 145-49, 178 (citing Chinese sources discussing the
trust laws of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan).
205. Li Qunxing, supra note 33, at 118 ("Increasingly, [the trust system] is
becoming a global legal system."); see also Frangois Barriere, Does China Cur-
rently Need a Trust Law?, in MATERIALS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS, supra
note 133, at 442, 442 (statement by a French participant in a Chinese sympo-
sium on the draft Trust Law that "[a]s globalization goes forward, it is desira-
ble to ensure that the Chinese trust legal framework be adapted to the needs
of the economic competition").
206. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing this dominant
question in comparative law literature on legal transplants).
207. See supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text (discussing scholars'
possible explanations for what makes a legal transplant succeed).
208. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text (summarizing Chinese
commentators' views regarding the impetus for drafting trust legislation).
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commentators made a persuasive case that introduction of the
trust law model "fit" China's reform agenda of the time.209 In
addition, they approached trust law as principally economic in
nature. 210 Although some authors expressed concerns about
trust law's possible tensions with Chinese cultural tradition,211
commentators seemed to regard introduction of the trust law
model as an "apolitical" transplant, one that largely avoided
such sensitive areas as constitutional, family, or religious law
or practice. 212 Finally, the Chinese trust law literature docu-
ments extensive and active involvement in the transplant
process by Chinese participants, including legislators, academ-
ics, government officials, lawyers, court personnel, and repre-
sentatives of Chinese trust and investment companies. 213 In so
doing, that literature provides evidence that trust law was a
"voluntary" rather than "imposed" transplant. 214
As the next Subsection discusses, the Chinese trust law li-
terature also provides invaluable information on the second
stage of the legal transplant process-the still ongoing efforts
to integrate the trust law model and adapt that model to fit
China's specific national conditions. Here too the literature
shows that Chinese lawmakers and scholars are making exten-
sive use of foreign trust law sources.
209. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing comparative law
scholars' arguments about the need for a transplant to fit the recipient's
reform agenda).
210. See, e.g., SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, supra note 136, at 1 ("A trust,
putting it as simply as possible, is a mechanism for administering property on
behalf of another person. In its essence, it is a plan or arrangement for the
transfer and administration of property."); see also Background Information,
supra note 173, at 179-80 (emphasizing the economic functions of trust law
and the trust system).
211. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing concerns re-
garding the possible inconsistencies between trust law and Chinese cultural
tradition).
212. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text (discussing compara-
tive law scholarship and emphasizing the importance of the "apolitical" subject
matter of legal transplants).
213. See EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES, supra note 145, at 2 (detailing
the work of Chinese organizations in a trust law draft workshop); supra note
187 (describing the participation of a variety of Chinese organizations and in-
stitutions in the drafting process).
214. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing comparative law




Chinese commentators acknowledge that their Trust Law
is an "imported item" 2 15 from abroad. Thus, not surprisingly,
comparative law research and analysis have continued to play
a prominent role since enactment of the Trust Law. This is par-
ticularly true in Chinese explanations of Trust Law provisions.
As Wang Qing and Guo Ce put it: "Our aim is to expand the
understanding of China's Trust Law articles by using the
source of trust law-Anglo-American law-as the starting
point."216
Even in works intended for a lay audience, Chinese au-
thors have relied heavily on foreign materials from civil law
and common law trust systems. A prime illustration is the 2001
book jointly compiled by members of the N.P.C. drafting group
and academics involved in the drafting process.217 The stated
goal of the book was to help Chinese citizens and organizations
"study" a law that was admittedly "difficult to understand." 218
To make the Trust Law more accessible, the authors presented
detailed annotated commentary on every Trust Law provi-
sion.219 These discussions were notable for their emphasis on
foreign law and practice. For example, the commentary on Ar-
ticle 2, the provision that defines "trust,"220 opened with a sec-
tion titled "Foreign and Taiwanese 221 Provisions on the Defini-
tion of Trust."2 2 2 The authors began the section by advising the
reader that "in order to make it easier to study and apply" Ar-
ticle 2, they would "first introduce foreign and Taiwanese pro-
visions on the definition of trust" and only then explain the
Chinese provision.223
Chinese commentators have also used foreign texts to high-
light Chinese trust law innovations. For example, in their
215. WANG QING & GUo CE, supra note 125, at 1.
216. Id. at 2.
217. See EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES, supra note 145, at preface.
218. Id.
219. See id. The book also contained a detailed summary of the drafting
process and key "legislative background materials," including Trust Law
drafts and N.P.C. committee reports and amendments. Id. at 1-6, 239-332.
220. 2001 Trust Law, supra note 124, art. 2.
221. The authors followed the practice discussed above, see supra note 146,
of referring to Taiwan as a part of China rather than a separate country. The
original Chinese-language text reads: Woguo Taiwan [Our Country's Taiwan].




TRUST LAW IN A CHINESE MIRROR
commentary on Article 21 of the Trust Law, the provision that
gives a trust settlor the right to require a trustee to change the
method for managing trust property, 224 Wang Qing and Guo Ce
began with a survey of American, English, Japanese, Korean,
and Taiwanese provisions on modification of trusts.225 The au-
thors concluded that Article 21's approach of allowing the set-
tlor to "exercise this right directly" rather than "requir[ing] ap-
plication to a court . . . is a special feature of China's Trust Law
provisions."2 2 6 Similarly, another author emphasized key dif-
ferences between common law and Chinese definitions of cha-
ritable trusts.227 He pointed out that all common law countries
divide such trusts into four categories: trusts for "the relief of
poverty; the advancement of education; the advancement of re-
ligion and other purposes beneficial to the community."228 He
noted that China, in contrast, has excluded trusts for the ad-
vancement of religion "[b]ecause China is a socialist coun-
try."229 Moreover, to respond to the "practical situation"230 in
China today, China has added new, distinctive categories of
charitable trusts, including trusts for "the relief of the disabled
and victims of natural calamities, the advancement of medical
and hygienic business and protection of ecological environ-
ment."231
Finally, Chinese commentators have drawn on foreign ex-
amples to identify flaws in P.R.C. Trust Law provisions and to
offer proposals for future study and amendments. For example,
based on her study of the U.S. Restatement of Trusts,232 Chen
Xiangcong identified problems in the Chinese Trust Law provi-
sions regarding when a settlor or a trustee can be the sole bene-
ficiary of a trust.23 3 She concluded that the Restatement "provi-
sions . .. are consistent with Chinese trust law. However,
American law expresses it more clearly."2 3 4 Similarly, drawing
224. 2001 Trust Law, supra note 124, art. 21.
225. WANG QING & GuO CE, supra note 125, at 56.
226. Id.




231. Id. For a comprehensive discussion of Chinese innovations, see gener-
ally ZHANG TIANMAN, supra note 139, at 313-403.
232. CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 163 (discussing section 115 of
the Restatement of Trusts).
233. Id. at 162-63 (discussing Article 43 of the Chinese Trust Law).
234. Id. at 163.
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on a comparative analysis of English, American, Japanese, Ko-
rean, and Taiwanese trust legislation, 235 Dong Xinzhong re-
vealed a gap in the Chinese Trust Law-inadequate coverage of
the trustee's duty of prudence-and proposed statutory
amendments to address this issue.236
A consistent theme in the Chinese literature both before
and after enactment of the Trust Law is the need to "nativ-
ize"2 3 7 a foreign trust system. As one Chinese drafter observed,
"regardless of whether the system is transplanted or adopted
by another nation, it must go through a process of nativization
and integration with the particular features of its host nation.
These national features consist of . . . the legal customs and
norms ... [and] the societal, economic, and cultural environ-
ment."2 3 8 Chinese authors have discussed at length the changes
European and Asian civil law countries have made to the com-
mon law system they transplanted.2 3 9 They have pointed out
that even a common law country, the United States, adapted
the original English model to fit its distinctive national condi-
tions and traditions. 240
235. Dong Xinzhong, supra note 153, at 21-22.
236. Id. at 22-23. See also Huang Suping, supra note 141 (drawing on U.S.
precedent to recommend introduction of the trustee's duty of prudent invest-
ment into Chinese trust law).
237. See, e.g., SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, supra note 136, at 51-55 (dis-
cussing the need to "nativize" [bentuhua] the Anglo-American trust system
and stating that, "[iun order to be successful, the 'nativization' of the trust sys-
tem must also coordinate with cultural, socio-economic, and other factors. All
receptions of legal systems must undergo a process of 'nativization."').
238. ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 108-09.
239. See, e.g., CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 4 (discussing the
spread of the Anglo-American trust system to civil law countries and the
change in the definition of trust to reflect the different civil law concept of
property ownership). Japanese trust law has received particular attention.
See, e.g., BIJIAo FA YANJIU, no. 5, 153 (2008) (publishing a translation of a
Japanese article on the 2006 Japanese Trust Law); Cong Xiaoyan, Dalu Faxi
Guojia Dui Ying Mei Fa Xintuo de Yinjin He Liyong: Yi Riben Wei Li [Civil
Law Countries'Introduction and Use of the Anglo-American Law Trust: Japan
as an Example], 10 LIAONING XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO, no. 7 (2008).
Both annotated commentaries, published in 2001, draw heavily on civil law
trust legislation and concepts. See EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES, supra note
145; WANG QING & Guo CE, supra note 125, at 1, 2. As the authors of one of
these books stated, "in every article annotation we compare analogous provi-
sions in civil law countries' trust laws and in Anglo-American law countries'
trust laws." Id. at 2.
240. SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, supra note 136, at 53; see also HUO YU-
FEN, supra note 145, at 9-10 (discussing how Americans have "gone a step fur-
ther" in their use of trusts than the English); Dong Xinzhong, supra note 153,
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One Chinese commentator harkened back to a bygone era
to remind readers that transplants of all stripes-legal or oth-
erwise-have a long history in China. Echoing the words of ni-
neteenth-century Chinese reformers, 241 Zhao Ming stated that
in looking to foreign trust models, China was "absorbing what
is useful and discarding what is not."2 42
The remainder of this Article will consider what China dis-
carded from the Anglo-American model it transplanted.
III. THE AMERICAN REFLECTION: CHINA'S IMAGE OF
AMERICAN TRUST LAW
Part II showed that comparative law research and analysis
have played a significant role in China's reception of foreign
trust law. This work has influenced the design, dissemination,
and "perfection"2 4 3 of Chinese trust legislation. This Part de-
monstrates that the Chinese literature has another benefit as
well. That literature offers American trust law specialists a
unique opportunity to view our own system critically from an
outsider's perspective. Close analysis of China's critique of
American trust law2 4 4 exposes a systemic flaw American refor-
mers need to address: inadequate constraints on trustees.
The Chinese trust law literature paints a disturbing pic-
ture of an American trust system out of balance. This system
favors trustees at the expense of settlors, beneficiaries, and
third parties alike. Chinese critics trace this imbalance to three
at 21-22 (contrasting American and English approaches to the trustee's duty
of prudent investment).
241. See DAVID M. LAMPrON, THE MAKING OF CHINESE FOREIGN AND SE-
CURITY POLICY IN THE ERA OF REFORM 159 (2001) (referring to "China's cen-
tury-old tradition of 'self-strengthening,' the notion that China could absorb
what is useful from the outside world while rejecting what it deemed harm-
ful"). Variations of this phrase have entered the modern lexicon as well. Mao
Zedong and even martial arts star Bruce Lee have used versions of this
phrase. See DAVIS MILLER, THE TAO OF BRUCE LEE 133 (2000)
("Lee ... adapted at least one of Mao Tse-tung's credos. 'Absorb what is useful;
reject what is useless,' Mao said. Lee expanded this to include, 'Add specifical-
ly what is your own."').
242. Zhao Ming, supra note 193, at 46.
243. Zhenting Tan, supra note 139 (beginning the title of his dissertation
"Perfecting the Chinese Law of Trusts"); see Luo Dajun, supra note 140, at 70
(discussing the need for trust law research to, inter alia, "perfect[] trust legis-
lation").
244. This Chinese critique does not always focus exclusively on flaws in the
American trust system. Often it is framed more generally as an attack on the
"Anglo-American" model. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing
and citing examples of Chinese use of term "Anglo-American").
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main factors: (1) the "negative attitude toward settlor
rights,"245 (2) insufficient protection of beneficiaries, and (3)
secrecy of trusts.
A. POWERLESS SETTLORS
In a Chinese mirror, American settlors are weak and ulti-
mately irrelevant. Once settlors establish trusts, American
trust law severs their ties to those trusts.246 Unless settlors had
the foresight to reserve rights in the trust instrument or to
name themselves trustees or beneficiaries, 24 7 they "do[] not
possess any rights whatsoever with respect to the trust proper-
ty or trustee."248 Indeed, this separation of settlor from trust is
so complete that American trust law denies settlors even the
status of party to their own trusts.249 Under the American defi-
nition of the trust, where once there were three parties to a
245. ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 90.
246. WANG QING & Guo CE, supra note 125, at 39 ("According to Anglo-
American law provisions, once the establishment of the trust is effective, the
settlor's ties with the trust are severed."); see Wen Xiaofang, Woguo 'Xintuo
Fa" Xintuo Jiancha Ren Zhidu Zhi Buzheng Sikao [Reflections on the Trust
Supervisor System in Our Country's "Trust Law" and Its Improvement], SHIDAI
JINRONG, no. 6 (2008) ("In the Anglo-American system, once the trust is estab-
lished, the settlor is removed from the trust relationship.").
247. WANG QING & GUo CE, supra note 125, at 126 ("In . . . Anglo-
American law countries, after the settlor establishes the trust, he generally
does not possess any substantive rights in the trust if he is not a beneficiary
and has not reserved pertinent rights in the trust instrument."); ZHONG RUI-
DONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 87 ("[If the settler wants to
possess these [trust] rights, he must adopt one of two methods: first, when he
establishes the trust he must expressly reserve these rights for himself; or,
second, when he establishes the trust, he must name himself as one of the
trustees."). Zhang Tianman mentions an additional method by which the set-
tlor can reserve rights-in a contract. ZHANG TIANMAN, supra note 139, at
342.
248. ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 86; see also
ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 148 ("Under Anglo-American law, if the
settlor has not reserved in the trust instrument the rights to modify, termi-
nate, or revoke the trust, then after the trust is established . . . . [t]here is no
relationship of rights and duties between the settlor and the trustee.").
249. See ZHANG TIANMAN, supra note 139, at 342 (stating that unless the
settlor reserves rights, he "does not have any legal relationship whatsoever
with the trust [and] . . . loses his status in the trust"); Zhenting Tan, supra
note 133, para. 46 ("In common law countries, the settlor, after creation of the
trust, has nothing to do with it if he does not reserve any rights for himself in
the trust instrument. . . . [A]nd the settlor is hardly a party to the trust though
he/she is a party to the creation of the trust.").
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trust, now only two parties exist-the trustee and the benefi-
ciary.250 The settlor becomes at best an interested bystander.251
For Chinese scholars, the very notion of cutting off settlors
from their own trusts is perverse. As Zhong Ruidong and Chen
Xiangcong put it: "[T]he trust relationship, after all, is estab-
lished by the settlor." 2 5 2 Moreover, the American approach
misses another obvious point-the "constructive role"2 5 3 of set-
tlors in enforcing their own trusts. Who better than settlors can
determine whether the trust purposes, beneficiary rights, and
trustee duties they themselves prescribed are "conscientiously
fulfilled?" 254 Yet, rather than promoting this beneficial, even
indispensable, function of settlors, American trust law actually
impedes it.
One example the Chinese literature commonly cites is the
negative American attitude toward settlors' rights to informa-
tion.2 5 5 Unlike nearly all trust systems worldwide, 256 the U.S.
250. See CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 4 ("Anglo-American law le-
gal scholars' definition of the trust, in contrast, recognizes only the relation-
ship between the trustee and the beneficiary."); Wen Xiaofang, supra note 246
("Once the trust is established .... [tihe trust relationship is between only the
trustee and the beneficiary.").
251. Compare WANG QING & Guo CE, supra note 125, at 56 ("In Anglo-
American law countries, under general circumstances, only if at the time the
trust is established the settlor reserved in the trust instrument the right to
adjust the method for managing trust property can the settlor do so. Other-
wise he cannot interfere in the trustee's management of trust property."), with
ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 90 (noting one "ex-
ception to Anglo-American trust laws' negative attitude toward settlor
rights"). They state that "all countries' trust laws stipulate that the settlor has
the right to require the trustee to adjust the method for managing trust prop-
erty." Id. Even American trust law "recognize[s] that the settlor possesses this
right [and] ... adopts this favorable attitude." Id.
252. ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 91.
253. Id. at 89.
254. Id. (stating that extending rights to the settlor "helps trust parties su-
pervise and encourage the trustee to fulfill his duties conscientiously, ensures
that the trust purpose is realized, etc."); see CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136,
at 183 ("[P]roviding the settlor so many rights is a beneficial tool .... It in-
creases the settlor's power to supervise the trustee's management and disposi-
tion of trust property . . . . [I]t is beneficial for protecting the beneficiary's in-
terests."); WANG QING & GUO CE, supra note 125, at 54 (reporting that civil
law countries extended rights to the settlor "out of concern for supervision of
trusts and also for ensuring the accomplishment of the trust purpose").
255. See, e.g., WANG QING & GUO CE, supra note 125, at 54 (discussing the
fact that "[w]ith respect to the settlor's information rights, Anglo-American
law countries generally do not have any provisions").
256. For discussions and analyses of civil law trust law provisions on set-
tlors' rights to information, see EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES, supra note
145, at 102; SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, supra note 136, at 108-09; WANG
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system denies settlors what they need most to supervise trusts
and protect beneficiaries: "the right to be informed and monitor
whether the trustee manages and disposes of [trust] property in
accordance with [the settlor's] intent and trust purpose."257 In-
stead, American trust law relies on those who are often less
likely to understand, demand, and act on trust information-
beneficiaries. 258 Beneficiary age, incompetence, and inexpe-
rience may well render these rights meaningless.259
Chinese scholars and drafters have categorically rejected
the U.S. approach to the status of settlors. 260 Instead, as Wang
Qing and Guo Ce have aptly observed, Chinese trust law "gives
prominent emphasis to the settlor's rights and interests."261
This view pervades both the Chinese trust law literature and
legislation. Chinese scholars reconnect settlors to trusts. Draw-
ing on civil law precedent, they define the trust from beginning
to end as a relationship among three parties: the settlor, the
trustee, and the beneficiary. 262 Indeed, according to Chinese
authors, this three-party relationship even survives the set-
QING & GuO CE, supra note 125, at 54.
257. ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 89.
258. See infra Part III.B (discussing "defenseless beneficiaries"). Chinese
commentators and drafters recognize that settlors too may lack the expertise
to understand trust documents. As a result, the Chinese Trust Law includes a
provision that allows the settlor to require the trustee to provide explanations
of trust administrative matters. See ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG,
supra note 145, at 89 (providing annotated commentary to Article 20 of the
Trust Law).
The settlor is in a passive position. Some settlors may lack the ap-
propriate business knowledge. As a result, the settlor can require
that the trustee provide an explanation of management and distri-
bution of trust property and the details of revenue and expendi-
tures, especially when the settlor has suspicions or problems arise.
The trustee must provide answers.
Id.
259. See Wen Xiaofang, supra note 246 (setting out types of beneficiaries
who may be unable to exercise their statutory rights under the Trust Law).
260. See, e.g., WANG QING & Guo CE, supra note 125, at 54 (discussing
Chinese Trust Law provisions that reject the Anglo-American approach to set-
tlors' rights in favor of the civil law model); ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANG-
CONG, supra note 145, at 88 (rejecting the Anglo-American view that a settlor
loses ownership rights after transferring property to a trust and the require-
ment that a settlor must petition a court for modification of a trust).
261. WANG QING & GUO CE, supra note 125, at 62.
262. CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 4 ("Civil law countries' defini-
tion of the trust recognizes that the trust relationship involves three parties:
the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary."); Bian Yaowu, supra note 133, at 54
(stating that in China "a trust ... has three parties, including the grantor,
trustee, and beneficiary").
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tlor's death. The settlor's heirs assume the settlor's status,
rights, and duties. 263
The Chinese trust law literature and the Trust Law itself
consistently "stress the settlor's status and rights."264 The goal
is to strengthen the position of the settlor to ensure the optimal
balance between settlor and trustee rights. 265 As a Chinese
lawyer explained in an early analysis of the P.R.C. Trust Law,
this balance "gives the creator of the trust the ability to control
the trustee's activity in managing the trust while providing the
trustee with the necessary autonomy."2 66 To achieve this bal-
ance, Chinese drafters rejected this portion of the American
model in no uncertain terms. Chapter IV of the Chinese Trust
Law provides settlors extensive rights to monitor and enforce
their own trusts. 267 These range from rights to review, tran-
263. See SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, supra note 136, at 108 (stating that
"[the settlor (including the settlor's heirs)" have rights to information); ZHOU
XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 101 (stating that under the Japanese and Ko-
rean trust laws the settlor's heirs take over the settlor's rights).
264. WANG QING & GUO CE, supra note 125, at 126 ("China's Trust Law
stresses the settlor's status and rights."); see also Zhenting Tan, supra note
133, para. 47 ( "The Chinese Law of Trusts lays particular emphasis on the
intention of the settlor . . . .").
265. See CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 183 (describing China's ex-
tensive settlor rights as an "equalization of parties' rights"); WANG QING &
GUO CE, supra note 125, at 55 ("By balancing the settlor's and the trustee's
rights, the beneficiary's interests and the trust purpose are accom-
plished .... ").
266. Richard Qiang Guo, supra note 135.
267. For summaries and analyses of settlors' statutory rights and their lim-
its, see, for example, EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES, supra note 145, at 88-
109; WANG QING & GUo CE, supra note 125, at 53-63; ZHONG RUIDONG &
CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 86-97. Chinese scholars recognize the
dangers as well as the benefits of expansive settlor rights:
On the other hand, as far as the trustee is concerned, providing the
settlor so many rights can cause the settlor to have excessive control
of trust property. This inevitably has an impact on the efficiency and
initiative of the trustee's management. As far as the beneficiary is
concerned, if the settlor enjoys so many rights, then to a certain de-
gree this means a reduction in the beneficiary's rights and greater
limits on the beneficiary's freedom. Moreover, it could make the bene-
ficiary's interest more undefined. As far as the trust system is con-
cerned, the significance of the trust is not the same as giving the set-
tlor the greatest advantage but consists of recognizing the trustee as
a person with property rights. With respect to management and dis-
position of trust property, basically there should not be settlor inter-
ference. Moreover, providing the settlor with so many rights could
make confusing the difference between the trust system and an en-
trustment agency.
CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 183-84; see also Wen Xiaofang, supra
note 246 (arguing that by providing extensive rights to the settlor China's
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scribe, and copy trust documents, 268 to rights to revoke impro-
per trustee transactionS 269 and sue trustees for malfeasance
and mismanagement. 2 7 0 In fact, some Chinese scholars have
claimed that these statutory provisions are so expansive that
they "blaze(] a new trail" 2 7 1 in their recognition of settlors'
rights. In support, they cite the fact that China's Trust Law is
the only legislation in the world that allows settlors to modify
trust administrative terms and to dismiss trustees without any
court involvement. 272
In the final analysis, the Chinese settlor bears little re-
semblance to its American prototype. Chinese scholars and
drafters found the American settlor so flawed that they de-
signed their own version-a settlor who would remain a force to
be reckoned with throughout the life of the trust. As the next
Section shows, China's vision of the American beneficiary re-
veals equally problematic features.
B. DEFENSELESS BENEFICIARIES
China's depiction of American beneficiaries is troubling.
The Chinese trust law literature reveals beneficiaries our sys-
Trust Law has made "it easier for the beneficiary's interests to be infringed"
and emphasizing that "the beneficiary's interests can be infringed by the set-
tlor and also by the trustee").
268. 2001 Trust Law, supra note 124, art. 20.
269. Id. art. 22.
270. See id. The Trust Law also provides settlors rights to respond to bene-
ficiary as well as trustee misconduct. Id. art. 51 (permitting the settlor to mod-
ify or revoke a beneficiary's rights where that beneficiary has "grossly in-
fringed" the rights of the settlor or other beneficiaries). As I have discussed
elsewhere, this is consistent with China's "behavior-based model of inherit-
ance." Foster, supra note 124, at 162; see also Frances H. Foster, Towards a
Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?: The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 77 (1998) (discussing China's behavior-based model of inheritance).
271. CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 183.
272. See WANG QING & GUo CE, supra note 125, at 56, 62 (citing Articles
21 and 23 of the Trust Law as distinctive provisions of Chinese trust law);
ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 91 (explaining why
China departed from foreign precedent and gave the settlor (and beneficiary)
the direct right to require the trustee to change methods for administering the
trust rather than requiring court approval). The authors stress both practical
and theoretical reasons. They argue that "if the method for managing trust
property requires change, this should be done quickly. There should not be any
delay. Thus, allowing the settlor and the beneficiary directly to require the
trustee to make changes can avoid a complex court process, which is beneficial
for implementing the trust." Id. In addition, they contend that because the set-
tlor created the trust, "unless exceptional circumstances occur, the settlor
should be allowed directly to require the trustee to change management me-
thods without going to court." Id.
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tem has left behind-the young, the sick, the nameless, even
the unborn.273 It shows that in the United States those most
vulnerable to trustee abuse and neglect must fend for them-
selves.
According to Chinese scholars, American trust law makes
beneficiaries the principal, and often only, check on trustees. 274
This model simply assumes that beneficiaries can defend their
own rights and interests. Except in the charitable trust context,
it provides no mechanism to protect those who cannot protect
themselves.275 Yet, as Chinese commentators emphasize, these
are precisely the beneficiaries for whom many settlors create
trusts. Indeed, in their 1999 treatise on trust law, Shi Tiantao
and Yu Wenran cited as their very first example of a trust the
trust that a deceased parent could use to "leave his property to
his children.. . [who] might be too young and might not be ca-
pable of managing property."276
Chinese authors argue that the American approach stands
in marked contrast to that used in civil law countries, especial-
ly Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. 277 They show that, unlike the
273. Chinese authors have identified a variety of beneficiaries American
trust law fails to protect-beneficiaries who are minors, lack or have limited
legal and mental capacity, are indefinite (because designated only by a class
label rather than by individual names), or are "not yet in existence." Wen
Xiaofang, supra note 246; see also ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 102
(stating that "[iun contrast to Anglo-American law," Japanese and Korean
trust laws protect beneficiaries whose "rights and interests are without ques-
tion threatened," beneficiaries who are not yet born, or are members of
classes). For a discussion of the status of unborn children as trust beneficiaries
and heirs, see ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 132.
274. See, e.g., ZHANG TIANMAN, supra note 139, at 256 (stating in a sum-
mary of American trust law that, "[t]he standard provision of trust law is that
the beneficiary has the right to compel the trustee to fulfill his duties. The
traditional rule holds that otherwise, there would be no person who has the
power and capability to restrain the trustee"); see also EXPLANATION OF THE
ARTICLES, supra note 145, at 17 (stating that in American law it is the benefi-
ciary who has the right to examine trust documents and accounts related to
property revenue and expenditures and the right to bring action for removal of
the trustee when the beneficiary thinks his rights have been harmed).
275. See Wen Xiaofang, supra note 246 ("Beneficiaries themselves should
protect their interests. This is a general rule of trust law. Therefore, in Anglo-
American trust law, except in the case of charitable trusts, there is no special
trust supervisor scheme.").
276. SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, supra note 136, at 1; see Zhou Xiaoming,
supra note 203, at 21, 22 ("[The trust is very suitable for people who for what-
ever reason (be it lack of time, mental or other incapacity, legal constraints,
etc.) are unable to manage property themselves.").
277. See, e.g., ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 102 (contrasting the An-
glo-American approach to that in Japan and Korea); Wen Xiaofang, supra note
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United States, these countries are not insensitive to the needs
of vulnerable beneficiaries. Instead, civil law countries recog-
nize that there are "circumstances [in which] beneficiaries have
no way to protect their rights."2 7 8 Rather than leaving vulnera-
ble beneficiaries defenseless, civil law trust laws have estab-
lished both external and internal mechanismS 279 to "provide
special increased protection for beneficiaries." 280 Chinese scho-
lars have called particular attention to one such mechanism,
the "trust supervisor" system. 281 This system empowers third
parties designated by the settlor or appointed by the court 282 to
"monitor whether the trustee is administering the trust in the
best interests of the beneficiary"283 and to represent the benefi-
ciary in litigation and other trust matters. 284 Chinese propo-
nents conclude that the trust supervisor system is an essential
scheme to achieve the two fundamental goals of trust law. It
246 (contrasting the Anglo-American approach with Japanese, Korean, and
Taiwanese trust law provisions and quoting those provisions).
278. ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 102.
279. See Wen Xiaofang, supra note 246 ("[C]ivil law countries' trust laws
clearly stipulate external as well as internal mechanisms for supervising
trusts. For civil trusts, the external supervision mechanism is the court. For
charitable trusts, the supervision mechanism generally is an agency for admi-
nistering charitable affairs. For commercial trusts, supervision generally is
carried out by an entity responsible for commercial matters."). The internal
mechanisms include trust supervisors and settlors. See infra notes 281-85 and
accompanying text (discussing trust supervisors); supra Part III.A (discussing
the role of settlors); see also Wen Xiaofang, supra note 246 (stating that in civil
law countries the "principal function of the settlor is to protect the benefi-
ciary's interests").
280. ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 102.
281. Some civil law countries use the term "trust managers" rather than
"trust supervisors." See CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 163 ("The Japa-
nese and Korean 'Trust Laws' call these 'trust managers' and the Taiwanese
'Trust Law' calls them 'trust supervisors."').
282. See id. at 164 ("Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese 'Trust Laws' pro-
vide that . . . the court can, either upon petition by an interested party or on
its own motion, appoint a person or persons to serve as supervisor. However,
this will not apply if the trust [supervisor] or selection method is designated in
the trust instrument."); Wen Xiaofang, supra note 246 ("[A]ppointment of a
trust supervisor . . . first should be done in accordance with directions in the
trust instrument. If the trust instrument does not contain any such provisions
or the person named in the trust instrument is unwilling to serve as the trust
supervisor, the court can appoint a trust supervisor upon petition by an in-
jured party.").
283. CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 163.
284. See ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 102 (noting that under Japa-
nese and Korean trust laws, "[t]his third party should for the sake of the bene-
ficiary ... see to all litigation and other related matters").
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helps "to balance parties' rights and interests and protect bene-
ficiaries' interests." 285
Interestingly, Chinese drafters by oversight or design fol-
lowed the American approach to beneficiaries. The Chinese
Trust Law provides beneficiaries sweeping rights to monitor
and enforce trusts,286 but mentions third-party representation
of beneficiaries only in the charitable trust context. 287 This fail-
ure to extend a trust supervisor scheme to private trusts has
received sharp criticism from Chinese authors. In a 2008 ar-
ticle, one critic went so far as to denounce this omission as "a
significant defect" caused in part by the "influence of Anglo-
American trust law."2 8 8 Thus, introduction of a comprehensive
trust supervisor system may well be in China's future. 289
Even under the current scheme, however flawed, Chinese
beneficiaries fare better than their American counterparts. As
the previous Section showed, 290 Chinese beneficiaries have
what American beneficiaries do not-settlors with the power to
speak for them and defend their interests.
C. INVISIBLE TRUSTS
Finally, the Chinese trust law literature exposes a third,
equally disturbing source of imbalance in American trust law-
invisible trusts. It reveals American trusts so secret that their
285. Wen Xiaofang, supra note 246.
286. The Chinese Trust Law extends to the beneficiary all rights the settlor
possesses under Articles 20-23. 2001 Trust Law, supra note 124, art. 49.
Those rights include rights to receive information, id. art. 20, to change ad-
ministrative terms, id. art. 21, to sue the trustee for malfeasance or negli-
gence, id. art. 22, and to remove the trustee, id. art. 23. For summaries of be-
neficiary rights, see, for example, HUO YUFEN, supra note 145, at 92; WANG
QING & GuO CE, supra note 125, at 124-25; ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANG-
CONG, supra note 145, at 135-38.
287. See CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 164 ("The Chinese 'Trust
Law' only provides in Article 64 that a charitable trust supervisor must be es-
tablished by a charitable trust. It does not yet contain any provisions regard-
ing whether a trust supervisor can be designated for a private trust."). For dis-
cussions of the Chinese Trust Law's provisions on charitable trust supervisors,
see, for example, EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES, supra note 145, at 218-21;
WANG QING & Guo CE, supra note 125, at 152-56.
288. Wen Xiaofang, supra note 246.
289. For example, in her 2007 book, Chen Xiangcong noted that this issue
merits further "elaboration" and "discussion." CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note
136, at 164.
290. See supra Part III.A.
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very existence is known only to their settlors and trustees. 291
To make matters worse, because trusts are "continuous in na-
ture,"29 2 those trusts may well survive their settlor's death.
Thus, if the American settlor takes the secret to the grave, the
trustee alone may know that the property she enjoys is not her
own.
Chinese scholars point out that even if beneficiaries are
aware that such a trust exists, rules that promote secrecy of
trusts may make it impossible for beneficiaries to fulfill the role
American trust law assigns them as enforcer of trusts. 2 9 3 Be-
cause no record exists of an invisible trust's purpose, property,
parties, or fiduciary rights and duties, beneficiaries lack the in-
formation they need to monitor a trustee and hold that trustee
accountable for any misconduct. Indeed, secrecy of trusts may
effectively deny beneficiaries any claim whatsoever to trust
property. As Zhong Ruidong and Chen Xiangcong observed, "[ijf
the trust is not established in writing, after a considerable pe-
riod of time, when the beneficiary asserts his beneficial rights,
no evidence [of those rights] will exist."2 94 To Chinese authors,
the inevitable result is conflict 2 95 and uncertainty. 296
The Chinese trust law literature shows that secrecy of
trusts poses significant dangers as well for American third par-
ties who have a "legal relationship" 297 with the trustee. 298 When
291. If the settlor creates an oral, declared trust naming herself trustee,
only one person might know the trust exists. See infra notes 303-06 and ac-
companying text. A trust known to only two trust parties (or potentially one
settlor/trustee) is problematic because trusts involve many parties-"settlors,
trustees, beneficiaries, and numerous other civil law subjects"-and "the legal
relationships among them are quite complex." EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES,
supra note 145, at 44.
292. WANG QING & GUo CE, supra note 125, at 19 ("A trust is a process for
managing property or distributing property. It is continuous in nature.").
293. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussing the enforce-
ment role of beneficiaries).
294. ZHONG RUIDONG & CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 145, at 55.
295. See id. (stating that having no existing evidence of beneficiary rights
"will create conflicts").
296. See ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 204 (arguing that if China
permitted oral, declared trusts "there would surely be unpredictable risks").
297. Gu Dongwei & Sun Qiufang, Xintuo Fa Zhong Shoutuoren de Xiang-
dui Ren Liyi Baohu Yanjiu [On the Trust Law's Protection of the Interests of a
Person with Rights Against a Trustee], 10 FAZHI WEI SHEHUI 280, 280 (2007)
(focusing on this 'legal relationship" rather than all trust relationships).
298. Chinese authors recognize that third parties may have problems with
settlors and beneficiaries as well. See, e.g., EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES,
supra note 145, at 60 (stating that it is important to "separate trust property
from the settlor's, trustee's, and beneficiary's property and to indicate that
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trusts are secret, a third party has no way to "know the
truth"299 about whether the party on the other side of the table
is a trustee, the transaction violates the trust purpose, or the
property at issue is in fact trust property. Chinese authors ar-
gue that the effect is to injure both the individual involved in
the transaction with the trustee and the commercial system as
a whole. 300 Secrecy of trusts can cause third parties to "sustain
unwarranted harm,"30 1 and undermines the "security and effi-
ciency" 302 of commercial transactions.
Chinese commentators trace the invisible trust phenome-
non to two flaws in American trust law. First, the U.S. system
permits oral trusts. 303 Chinese authors have singled out one
form of oral trust for particular criticism, the so-called declared
trust.3 0 4 They emphasize that, unlike civil law countries, the
United States allows a property owner to establish a valid trust
without any transfer of title to the property or written record of
the trust and its terms. 305 All American trust law requires is
control of trust property has been transferred to the trustee"). Nonetheless,
their principal emphasis is on the relationship between trustees and third par-
ties. See Gu Dongwei & Sun Qiufang, supra note 297, at 280 ("[W]e only ad-
dress the third party's legal relationship with the trustee.").
299. ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 150 ("If there is no mechanism to
make a trust public, the third party will not know the truth that said property
has already become trust property."); see also WANG QING & GUo CE, supra
note 125, at 24 ("If there is not a definite scheme for making trusts public, a
third party will have no way to know whether given property is trust proper-
ty.").
300. See, e.g., Geng Lihang, supra note 137, at 11, 14 (arguing that publici-
ty is necessary to protect general creditors' interests).
301. Id. at 11.
302. CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 114; see also WANG QING & GuO
CE, supra note 125, at 24 (stating that if no system exists for making trusts
public, "[tihis harms commercial transactions").
303. See YU WEIMING, supra note 145, at 119 (noting that "in Anglo-
American countries' trust laws," trusts can be established orally); Zhu Yong &
Li Xuefeng, Ying Mei Fa Wei Yong Qiyue Jieyue Xintuo Falu Guanxi de Yua-
nyin Jiexi [An Analysis of the Reason Why Anglo-American Law Does Not Use
Contracts to Terminate Trust Law Relationships], 29 SHANGCHANG XIANDAI-
HUA (2007) ("[O]ral trust is among the methods by which trusts are estab-
lished under Anglo-American trust law.").
304. For discussions of declared trusts, see, for example, EXPLANATION OF
THE ARTICLES, supra note 145, at 12; ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 204.
305. See Zhu Yong & Li Xuefeng, supra note 303 (stating that under Anglo-
American trust law, a property owner can orally declare himself trustee and
"[t]he special feature of this method of establishing a trust is that it does not
involve transfer of property ownership rights"). According to Chinese commen-
tators, this lack of a transfer requirement is why civil law countries rejected
declared trusts. See HUO YUFEN, supra note 145, at 81 ("Because establish-
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that the property owner make an oral statement that she is
trustee of the property for the benefit of others. 306 The set-
tlor/trustee is then free to administer the property in accor-
dance with fiduciary rights and duties that only she herself
knows.
Second, Chinese authors identify another flaw that pro-
motes secrecy of trusts-the U.S. system's failure to require
registration of trusts except in the charitable trust context. 307
They argue that "public notice of trusts" 3 0 8 is essential to en-
sure that beneficiaries, third parties, and the general public
can "easily look up the trust purpose,"309 property, and parties'
rights and duties. They emphasize that American trust law di-
verges from international practice.310 Even in the birthplace of
trusts-England-"all trusts must be registered."311
Chinese authors have consistently warned of the dangers
of the American approach. They argue that secrecy of trusts
ment of declared trusts does not require transfer of property, Korea, Japan,
and other countries' current trust laws do not recognize the effectiveness of
declared trusts.").
306. See CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 108 ("In an oral trust, the
settlor declares a trust of property in which he has legal ownership rights or
an equitable interest and names himself the trustee. Because the settlor dec-
lares himself the trustee of said property and holds said property for the bene-
ficiary's benefit, he does not have to transfer the property and can declare that
he has established an inter vivos trust."); SHI TIANTAO & YU WENRAN, supra
note 136, at 30 (defining a declared trust as one in which "the settlor ... dec-
lares that he possesses, administers, or distributes part of his property as
trust property and gives the right to benefit from said property to another per-
son (the beneficiary)").
307. See CHEN XIANGCONG, supra note 136, at 114 ("In Anglo-American
law systems, trust registration is a requirement only for establishing charita-
ble trusts. For the vast majority of private trusts, however, the Anglo-
American law system provides no rules for public notice of trusts."). Chinese
authors recognize that "Anglo-American law countries' laws ... require that
certain types of property be registered by relevant government bodies." Id.
However, they emphasize that the U.S. system does not have a comprehensive
"scheme for public notice of trusts." ZHOU XIAOlIlNG, supra note 139, at 150-
51.
308. WANG QING & GUO CE, supra note 125, at 23 (explaining the term
"public notice of trusts" and noting its use in the trust laws of Japan, Korea,
and Taiwan); ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 150 ("So-called public notice
of trusts means that when a trust has been established the relevant property
must go through certain procedures to make the trust known to the general
public.").
309. Gu Dongwei & Sun Qiufang, supra note 297, at 281.
310. See, e.g., ZHOU XIAOMING, supra note 139, at 150 (stating that the
U.S. approach to public notice of trusts is "an important difference" from the
civil law approach, with particular focus on the laws of Japan and Korea).
311. EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLES, supra note 145, at 60.
TRUST LAW IN A CHINESE MIRROR
leaves beneficiaries and third parties dependent on the "utmost
honesty"312 of trustees. In the wrong hands, invisible trusts can
become traps for the unwary and, as Yu Weiming put it, "in-
strument[s] for fraud."3 13 Chinese drafters as well as scholars
decided that these risks are unacceptable.
The Chinese Trust Law codifies China's rejection of the
U.S. model. Article 8 mandates that all trusts must be in writ-
ing.314 A drafter explained the rationale for this requirement:
"The legislative purpose of the written form condition for the
creation of a trust is to strengthen the definitiveness of the
trust purpose and rights and obligations of the trust parties so
as to reduce disputes or facilitate the settlement of disputes." 315
In fact, some Chinese commentators have claimed that China
has adopted the most stringent requirements in the world for
creating trusts.316
Article 10 further repudiates the U.S. model by requiring
registration of trusts. 317 According to authors of annotated
commentary on the P.R.C. Trust Law, the principal goals of
this provision were "to make clear the legal status of trust
property and to protect the interests of third parties."318 If Chi-
nese reformers have their way, China's trust registration
scheme soon may be strengthened even more "to create a ba-
lanced relationship between trust parties . .. [and] outside
creditors." 319
In the end, then, the Chinese trust law literature sends an
unmistakable message to American and Chinese readers alike.
312. YU WEIMING, supra note 145, at 121. According to Yu Weiming, the
very reason China had to establish strict requirements for establishing trusts
was concern regarding the low "degree of honesty currently in our country." Id.
313. Id.
314. 2001 Trust Law, supra note 124, art. 8 (providing that trusts must be
established in written form).
315. Bian Yaowu, supra note 133, at 54.
316. See YU WEIMING, supra note 145, at 121 ("Looking worldwide, our
country has the most demanding requirements with respect to the forms for
establishing trusts."); cf. Zhenting Tan, supra note 133, paras. 29-30 (stating
that the Chinese rule that trusts be created in writing "provides for a much
more stringent requirement" than common law countries' trust laws).
317. 2001 Trust Law, supra note 124, art. 10 (providing that when trust
property is required by relevant laws and administrative regulations to be reg-
istered, it must go through trust registration procedures when a trust is estab-
lished). This provision also requires retroactive registration of trust property
that was not properly registered when the trust was established and declares
that "failure to do so will result in the trust being void." Id.
318. WANG QING & Guo CE, supra note 125, at 24.
319. Geng Lihang, supra note 137, at 13-14.
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The most effective, fair, and moral trust system is one that re-
cognizes and balances the needs of all parties affected by
trusts-settlors, beneficiaries, and third parties as well as trus-
tees.
CONCLUSION
Comparative law scholars define their central mission as to
"render the foreign familiar."320 Drawing on their linguistic ex-
pertise, interdisciplinary training, and cultural sensitivity,
comparativists make even the most foreign legal systems ac-
cessible to a domestic audience. Nowhere is this more evident
than in the scholarship on legal transplants. A vast and ever-
growing literature has provided comprehensive analyses of the
features, functions, and impact of legal transplants. 321
This Article has suggested a new mission for the compara-
tive law field-to render the familiar foreign.322 It has demon-
strated that study of a foreign system can provide invaluable
perspectives for domestic legal scholars and reformers. 323 Spe-
cifically, this Article has examined China's recent experience
with transplanting the American trust law model. 324 It has
shown that the most telling lessons may be found in what Chi-
na rejected rather than what China adopted. China's critique of
American trust law provides a mirror for us to see our own sys-
tem more clearly. And, as is so often true in life, the image in
the mirror turns out to be less attractive than expected.
The Chinese trust law literature reveals an American trust
system out of balance, a system that favors trustees at the ex-
pense of settlors, beneficiaries, and third parties. 325 This litera-
ture shows that American trust law cuts settlors off from their
own trusts, 326 leaves beneficiaries unprotected from trustee
320. I borrow this phrase from Vincent Crapanzano's Hermes' Dilemma:
The Masking of Subversion in Ethnographic Description, in WRITING CUL-
TURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY 51, 52 (James Clifford &
George E. Marcus eds., 1986).
321. See supra Part I.A.
322. Cf. Frances H. Foster, Parental Law, Harmful Speech, and the Devel-
opment of Legal Culture: Russian Judicial Chamber Discourse and Narrative,
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 923, 992 (1997) (suggesting that "[c]omparative law
translation of methodology" could make a similar contribution).
323. See supra Part I.B.
324. See supra Part II.
325. See supra Part III.
326. See supra Part III.A.
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abuse,327 and denies trust parties and third parties alike know-
ledge of the terms, administration, 328 and even the very exis-
tence of trusts. 329 China's critique exposes the dangers of what
both American and Chinese scholars have aptly called a system
of "trusting trustees." 330
Ironically, the American trusts and estates field is not ad-
dressing this imbalance, but instead appears to be heading in
precisely the opposite direction. Under the influence of law and
economics theory, prominent scholars and reformers are rapid-
ly dismantling the traditional legal and moral constraints on
trustees. 3 3 1 Trusts are becoming mere "contracts," and trust
law nothing more than "default rules." 3 3 2 "Efficiency" is tri-
umphing over morality. In the law and economics universe of
foresighted settlors, loyal trustees, informed beneficiaries, and
sophisticated family and commercial creditors, trusting trus-
tees may make sense. In the real world, however, it does not. A
trust system that exalts trustee autonomy over accountability
can and increasingly does impose significant human costs on all
affected by trusts. 333
China's critique of American trust law challenges U.S. re-
formers to reconsider their current course. In a Chinese mirror,
we can see that trusting trustees is the problem, not the solu-
tion.
327. See supra Part III.B.
328. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text (discussing settlors'
lack of access to information regarding administration of their own trusts).
329. See supra Part III.C.
330. See Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the
Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 67 (2005) (using the phrase "trusting
trustees"); Zhenting Tan, supra note 133, para. 31 (using a slight variant of
that phrase-"trusting a trustee").
331. For an outstanding critical analysis of recent trust law scholarship
and reform, see Leslie, supra note 330; see also Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of
the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor Langbein, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 541, 550-67 (2005) (criticizing Langbein's proposal to eliminate
the trust law's no further inquiry rule, which serves to protect beneficiaries
from trustee abuse).
332. Leslie, supra note 330, at 68.
333. For examples of those human costs, see Frances H. Foster, Trust Pri-
vacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 584-612 (2008).
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